“America tends to underestimate the political cost of this. One post-communist minister recalls trying vainly to convince his American counterparts that staying in Iraq was rather unpopular at home. American military aid to the new democracies has been stingy. And the cost and hassle of America’s visa policies grate harshly. “Estonians don’t understand why their sons are dying in Iraq for democracy and freedom, and yet their families can’t get visas for the United States,” says Toomas Hendrik Ilves, a former foreign minister.

So far, only Slovenia’s 1.9m people have visa-free travel to America. Poland and the Czech Republic have lobbied hard; so did Mrs Vike-Freiberga on her recent trip. But there is little sign of change. In most post-communist countries, each visa application costs a non-refundable $100—a week’s wages. In Romania, even the appointment costs $11, for seven minutes of telephone time.” (Empahsis Mine)

Comment
To be fair to the Bush Administration, the US has lobbied hard for the “Big Bang” approach that has led many of “New Europe” states to be accepted into the EU and has given Central Europe some voice in the world stage through branding them as part of a “New Europe”.

However, the US must follow though on building a relationship with these states. While sending troops to Iraq has bought countries like Estonia closer ties to the US, simple things like visa-restriction fail to show what clear benefit such sacrifices provide back.

Just like at home, the Bush Administration should pursue a campaign to show the people – of Estonia, Poland etc – the benefits of closer ties with the US. Currently, we’re not doing that (or enough) and worse than that we’re losing our chance to prove these people right the next time around.

Additionally, while countries like Bulgaria and Slovenia are small, they represent members of a growing bloc – the European Union – and a post-nation-state identify of “Europeanness”. The US must reach out – both at government and public level – to those who are receptive to the US.

Indeed, reaching out to the Central Europe region (where in Hungary there is a statue in honor of Ronald Reagan in remembrance of the Cold War), can act as a balance to the German and French states, while the US could also provide security against the fear of a possibly reassertive and aggressive Russia (as long as the EU remains anemic in security terms).

Let’s hope that the Post-Bush Administration, whatever that maybe – will take things into the positive direction, if the current Administration cannot.

StratFor’s article is interesting because it takes account to the role of Mendevev, whereas Jamestown Foundation, Eurasianet et al have been more focused on Putin or Russia itself.

So, who is this Medvedev?

In mid-November, Russian President Vladimir Putin named Dmitry Medvedev as first deputy prime minister. Medvedev is a rather rare personality in Russian politics, in that he is a modernizer who has not become unrealistically optimistic about Russia ever looking like — much less joining — the West, and a nationalist who has not fallen prey to the debilitating paranoia that often characterizes Russian policy. He also happens to be Putin’s protégé and the board chairman of Gazprom. The Ukraine natural gas crisis was his first Russian foreign-policy initiative.

Medvedev, like all Russians, recognizes that his country’s long-term prospects without Ukraine are, at best, bleak. That means that Russia’s European relations have become of secondary importance — they are no longer an end in their own right, but rather a means to other ends.

According to Stratfor, Medvedev’s motivations are similar to what was mentioned in StrategyUnit’s article: a method to reassert Russia on the world stage, taking advantage of the G-8 chairmanship to set the tone of its chairmanship. In this case it is to force Europe to consider Russia’s interests, power and importance seriously.

Prior to the Jan. 1 shutoff, the Europeans had become complacent, unappreciative of the scope of their dependency upon Russia or how much they have taken a “friendly” Moscow for granted since the end — or even before the end — of the Cold War. Energy supplies to Europe continued throughout the Afghan war, the 1983 war scare, the Moscow Olympic boycott, the putsch against Gorbachev, the Soviet breakup, the Chechen war, the Kosovo war, and the enlargements of NATO and the EU. The Europeans grew confident that as far as energy supplies were concerned, the Russians — while unpredictable in their rhetoric — were rock-solid in their reliability.

Medvedev’s primary goal was to redefine European perceptions of Russia. As of Dec. 31, Western Europeans perceived Russia primarily as an easily dismissed, benign former foe. But with the Gazprom cutoff — which diminished gas supplies needed for heating in the middle of winter — Russia proved itself not only sufficiently erratic to be taken seriously, but also capable of inflicting very real pain with a modicum of effort.

Now, did the Russians want to hurt the Europeans? Of course not. Europe, particularly “old” Europe, remains a potential partner for Moscow, and there is no reason for the Kremlin to introduce spite into an already complex relationship. But did the Russians want the Europeans to know that the Kremlin has the capacity and chutzpah to turn the screws? Absolutely. And doing so at a time of year when the wind whipping off the North Sea is anything but balmy adds that ever-incisive Russian touch.

This is not about establishing trust, but about establishing in Europe a respect for Russia’s strengths and an awareness of Russia’s concerns.
…
The elegance of Medvedev’s strategy lies in the fact that simply causing the Europeans to think about Russian interests means that the Kremlin has driven a wedge not only between the Europeans and the Ukrainians, but between the Europeans and the Americans. If Russia is to recover what it has lost in geopolitical stature these past 15 years, this is precisely the sort of policy that will give it a fighting chance.

The entire article has more details regarding Ukraine’s motivations and calculations as well as its historic importance to Russia. Most interestingly it points to Yushchenko potential use of the gas issue as a way to play the “anti-Russian” card to boost his popularity for the upcoming March parliamentary elections.

If someone would like to see the article, please let me know and I can forward it. I am unsure if its available freely online.

Introduction

With the breakdown in price negotiations during recent days, Russian state-owned Gazprom choose to cut the gas deliveries to Ukraine, the main conduit for exports to the rest of Europe. This is a critical situation because, as mentioned by Bloomberg, “State-run Gazprom supplies about a quarter of gas consumed in Europe and ships about 75 percent of that volume through Ukrainian pipelines.”

Washington Post provides further details on the outcome: “On Sunday, with no agreement on a new price, Russia cut by 120 million cubic meters a day the volume of gas it sent down the Ukrainian pipeline — Ukraine’s share. But there were soon reports that the volume of gas reaching Austria, Italy, France, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Croatia at the other end had fallen by as much as 40 percent.

Gazprom claimed that Ukraine was stealing gas — about $25 million worth on Sunday alone, according to Alexander Medvedev, Gazprom’s deputy chairman”

Russian Climbdown

But only one day after cutting the gas supply, Russia has been forced to restore the supply with mounting criticism from Europe and US on Russia’s ability to be a reliable energy partner. Gazprom, however, tried to square all blame on Ukraine:

“With the aim of preventing a possible energy crisis caused by Ukraine illegally taking gas, Gazprom has taken the decision to deliver additional gas into the gas transport system of Ukraine,” the company said in a statement.

“We stress that the additional delivery of gas is not designed for Ukrainian consumers but is meant for transit through the territory of Ukraine for delivery to consumers outside the borders of Ukraine.”

Europe, IEA and the US are placing blame on Russia for the current crisis, demonstrating the limits of Russia’s “Petro-Power”.

Russian Stabs Itself and Stumbles

In the long term, Ukraine will have to come to a compromise with Russia leading to higher prices. But more substantially, Russia’s heavy handed tactics against Ukraine will backfire throughout Europe and Russia’s energy customers. What Russia has seeming underestimated is the reaction from Europe because of its actions against Ukraine. What Russia’s hardball tactics has done for Europe is to:

1. Highlight Europe’s dangerous energy dependency on an increasingly authoritarian Russia
2. Confirm the fear that Russia will turn to its energy resources as its main leverage of power in the global stage
3. Encourage European states to find alternative energy sources, away from Russia (Neighboring Finland is already building its first nuclear to move away from Russia)
4. Highlight that Putin and Russia cannot be trusted in other important issues like Iran, North Korea et cetera
5. Encourage speeding the process to include Ukraine in western institutions like NATO and the EU
6. Underline that the Russian-German gas pipeline (expected to be completed by 2010) is a naked attempt by Russia to consolidate its power and influence in Europe
7. Seals Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder image as sell-out for Moscow, as he is now working on Gazprom’s Russian-German Gas Pipeline
8. Draw increasing criticism to Russia for its increasing authoritarian use of power, such as the banning of NGOs, that will only grow as Russia assumes head of the G-8 this year.
9. Increase calls for Russia to be removed from the G-8 for not being a major world economy, a democracy or even a free-market state

This arrogant move against Ukraine amid recent criticism for restricting NGOs and holding the G-8 chair may be a signal that Putin’s consolidation of power is leading Russia to a belligerent authoritarian state, rather than a corporatist Russia (think Singapore) that can help consolidate Moscow’s power before Russia deteriorates and bring Russia back economically.

Conclusion
Ukraine and Russia are still a long way from resolving the issue, but so far we can conclude that even if Russia gets what it wants from Ukraine, it still come out loser on the world stage and its reputation as reliable energy partner is soiled. At this point in the situation, it is difficult to see how Russia stands to benefit against Ukraine and the world stage. The loss in international standing is costing a lot more than any possible gain from Ukraine.

Post-Script: A Contrarian View, Russia Exerts Power?
To keep the analysis balanced (since events are too early to call), Putin could be purposely timing the move against Ukraine because of its G-8 chairmanship.

It is possible that Putin wants to demonstrate that Russia is willing to flex its economic muscle regardless of its cost to the world stage and that in the face of an increasingly energy vulnerable Europe, Russia’s power is very much real. True, states like Finland are increasingly promoting nuclear energy as an alternative, but they take years to build and Russia has the largest natural gas reserve while Norway and the UK’s has dwindled.

In short, this event could be a move to show that Russia is not to be taken for granted as the world “natural gas tank station” to be tapped freely by Europe or its other customers. Raw/Single commodity export states are viewed somewhat disparging as backward states for advanced states to exploit – this is something that obviously Putin would not like Russia labeled as.

However, such increase in fear and power would only be a short/medium term gain. In the long run, such hardballing tactics would likely motivate Europe to move away from Russia – be it using nuclear power or alternative sources of natural gas. Thus, this is a risky gamble for Russia to make, if indeed this is Putin’s intentions.

Other Related Issues
Below are some related points to the Ukraine-Russia issue and maybe of interest to StrategyUnit readers.
1. Punishing a former-Client State or Adjusting to New Realities?
There has been much criticism that Russia is merely being a bully because: 1) since the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has reoriented itself to the West (including NATO and EU); and 2) The previous contract locked in prices at $50 tcm from 2004 to 2009.

It is both true that the current $50 tcm is below market price and that Russia does vary its prices – ranging from $160 tcm for Moldova (also aligning itself to the West) to $47 tcm for Belarus, a firm Russian ally. The Russian-Ukrainian contract did set the price at $50 tcm, but it also mentioned the need for annual negotiations. This is typical of many energy contracts.

As for “Russia punishing West-tilted Ukraine” that is mentioned in the Western media, this must be placed in a larger context: If Ukraine is no long aligning itself with Russia, why should Russia continue to subsidize natural gas to Ukraine?

Additionally, Ukraine is selling Russian subsidized gas to other neighboring states at a profit. The idea of Ukraine profiting and potentially buying NATO equipment by selling subsidized Russian gas is not something Russia should tolerate.

Where Russia has gone wrong is the use of heavy-handed tactics, instead of agreeing to gradual price increases to Gazprom’s demanded “market” rates.

2. Russia and Limits to Geography

Despite its size, Russia is confounded by problems similar to other energy exporting states like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: It is a largely landlocked state with limited export options.

Additionally, natural gas is more difficult to export than oil – where tankers can more easily transport crude oil to ports. Liquefied Natural gas tankers and ports require extensive investment into infrastructure. See the map below, which shows the major gas pipelines from Russia to Europe (from DOE).

Click here to Enlarge

With Ukraine being the main transit route for Russian natural gas to Europe, Ukraine has far larger leverage than as seen on the surface. As the only main transit route to the West (besides the smaller Belarus pipeline), Ukraine has some room to manuevre against Russia.

Indeed, we see that Russia cannot act against Ukraine without putting its relationship with the rest of Europe at risk. Despite Russia’s blame on Ukraine for decline of gas elsewhere, teh rest Europe will not accept itself as “collateral damage” in this dispute. These European states do not care if Ukraine is “stealing” the natural gas, it will pressure both Ukraine and Russia (more so) to resolve the difference. And in this game, Russia (with its great power ambition and high dependence on export) has more to lose than Ukraine.

3. Impact on planned German-Russian Gas Pipeline?

On the impact on the German-Russian pipeline, it is too soon to say which way things will go but there are some obvious paths:

1. Germany will become reluctant to build a pipeline that will only increase its dependency on Russia
2. Germany will continue to go along with the pipeline, but with high priority in finding alternative sources of natural gas or its substitutes

A contrarian path would be “Germany sees the need to speed up building the pipeline, so that the rest of Europe will not be effected by Russian actions against Ukraine and former-Warsaw states” – but such a move would only embolden Russia and will look foolish to Germany.

Here’s quick Weekend Reading…just in case you need a break from all that turkey and gravy. By the way, I’ve been doing some light posting this past two weeks, but I’ll start going back to the normal beat of things soon.

OxBlog on Jame’s Fellow’s “Why Iraq Has No Army” in December’s Atlantic Monthly

David Adensik does an analysis of James Fallows’ cover story in the Atlantic monthly “Why Iraq Has No Army”. The article has caused such a buzz that even “George Stephanopoulous attempted to use the article to cross-examine Donald Rumsfeld on Sunday morning.”

I agree with David Adesnik that despite the hype of a title, Fallows doesnt really say anything new nor goes into depth about anything groundbreaking. Adesnik also the lack of definately strong position in the article (from critical/pessimistic to hawkish) as reflective of the overall difficult position of the Democrats:

“So is there a third way that will allow Democrats to both criticize the war and be seen as hawkish? Yes there is. They can click their heels three times and say “I agree with John McCain.””

The article is available for subscribers only, but if you would like a copy let me know and I can email it over. And, dont forget your local library (via online database) may carry a copy.

Oil Drum’s “There’s A New Kid In Town — Iran Versus Kazakhstan”

I’ve done an extensive research on Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and energy resources as part of my thesis in college, so its interesting (but not too surprising) to see Oil Drum’s “There’s A New Kid In Town — Iran Versus Kazakhstan” – which boldy proclaims the growing importance of Kazakhstan OVER Iran on energy resources:

Iran is still a giant and Kazakhstan is a middle tier country among the world’s oil suppliers. Iran produced 4081/kbd in 2004, 5.2% of the world’s total while Kazakhstan produced 1295/kbd, a paltry 1.6% percent of the whole. Iran has 132.5 billon barrels in proven reserves, 11.1% of the world’s total while Kazakhstan has 39.6 billion barrels, a 3.3% world share. But let’s look into our chrystal ball to see what the future may look like.
…
Around the years 2008 to 2009 period, Kazakhstan is exporting more total oil supply to the OECD countries, China and (perhaps) India than Iran is (Empahsis mine)

Eurasianet’s “China joins the Central Asian Base Race”

Stephen Blank of Eurasianet writes on China’s recent move to secure a military base in Kyrgyzstan and even in Uzbekistan, which the US has recently been kicked out from.

While Blank focuses on Chinese miltiary presence on Central Asia, we should not forget the joint Chinese-Pakistan naval base in Gwadar, Pakistan.

Beijing’s search for a base has occurred against a backdrop of growing regional militarization and an intensification of great power rivalry in Central Asia. Thus, China’s requests of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, even if made sotto voce, have served to heighten the geopolitical jockeying in the region. It also suggests a growing willingness entertain the use of the military instrument to address regional issues. This cannot be considered a good sign.

While SCO (which includes Russia, China all all major Central Asian states) asked for the US militray to leave Central Asia, Blank correctly points out that Russia come out more strongly against a Chinese over a US presence in Central Asia.

In the UK: “Gas industry on brink of winter crisis”

The OilDrum and EnergyBulletin have been covering the less known natural gas issues that faces the US, UK and others, but here’s a mainstream news on UK’s winter energy crisis:

The country’s gas industry is on a knife edge this winter and could tip into crisis if there is a major breakdown in its ageing North Sea fields and pipelines, analysts said on Thursday.

Europe’s biggest consumer is fast running out of gas from the fields that once made it self sufficient and kept prices among the lowest in Europe. Today, UK gas is the world’s costliest fuel and winter supply will be the tightest in memory.Government ministers are under pressure to explain how one of the world’s richest nations has left its energy policy hostage to the weather and ageing North Sea equipment.

Since the fall fo the Soviet Union and more prominently under President Putin, there has been a great revival (See Radio Free Europe’s Piece) of the Cossack culture and increasing political clout including a movement to reassert their role as a security/military instrument of the state. And already it seems like they are back to performing ethnic cleansing duties in Russia.

Why is Putin using an old Imperial Russia approach to solving his country’s ills? Or is enigmatic Russia to be held by a different standard?

• From MosNews, “Russian Parliament Approves Law on Cossack Service“, 11/09/05
• From WaPo, “Revival of Cossacks Casts Muslim Group Out of Russia to U.S.“, 11/18/05
• From the RFE, “Russia: Moscow Opposes Don Cossacks’ Demand For ‘Own’ Oblast“, 11/08/05

Just last week, a bill pushed by President Putin was approved by the Duma approving for essentially the reinstating of the Cossack military role in the Russian State:

“According to the bill, Cossacks are to be sent for military service, as a rule, to military units with traditional Cossack names, to border units and the Internal Troops. Cossacks can also participate in the military and patriotic upbringing of young people, preventing and handling the consequences of emergency situations and natural disasters, guarding the state border and combating terrorism”

And week later, the Washington Post reports on how this Cossack revival is already showing its ugly self in the role of Cossacks in “soft” ethnic cleansing:

Thousands of Muslims from a small ethnic group known as the Meskhetian Turks are fleeing this Black Sea region for the United States. The exodus is caused by what human rights groups call a campaign of persecution sanctioned by local authorities and spearheaded by the Cossacks, a Russian militia that fought for the czars and is being revived.

In the past year, just more than 5,000 Meskhetian Turks have resettled in the United States as refugees, and 4,400 have approval to immigrate, according to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Another 7,000 have filed applications that U.S. officials are reviewing.

Keep in mind that the Cossack has been pursuing for a greater role in the North Caucasus – where troubled Chechnya lies and the place of the “Nalchik Raid“. If armed Cossack were brought to the North Caucasus, this would escalate an already deteriorating situation. Russia needs a holistic socio-economic, political and military solution to the Caucasus region, not the brute force of the Cossacks.

Meanwhile the Don Cossacks are trying to reassert themselves by pushing for recognition of their own oblast (province). They are trying to take advantage of Putin’s initiative to reduce the number of oblast in Russia, currently over 80 to a more manageable 20-30 oblast.

The Russian authorities will formally reject any request by the leaders of the State Register Don Cossacks to recreate the Don Cossack Oblast that existed a century ago by merging the present-day Rostov and Volgograd oblasts, “Nezavisimaya gazeta” reported on 3 November.

In the 16th century, Cossack settlers founded the republic of the Don Cossacks on the steppes along the lower and middle course of the Don River.

A spokesman for the Don Cossacks, Vladimir Ryabov, told that paper that the Don Cossacks intend to hold a referendum next year on merging the two regions. He also said that the Cossacks will revive their demand, first raised in the early 1990s, for the Cossacks to be given the status of a distinct ethnic group within Russia.

Indeed, he is right, this is definately not Arthur Conolly’s “Great Game”. In the latest alliance shift between the US, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were just as active in the game as were the major players (China, Russia and the US). And specifically for the US, its hand is rather weak to play such a game.

Indeed, the West should stop its obsession in painting the situation in Central Asia as some Great Game with the Central Asian states as pawns played by China, Russia and the US. The situation is more complicated with the US in a weak position and the Central Asian states are by no means passive.

First Uzbekistan drops the US and finds a new friend in Russia…
Not too long ago, Karimov’s Uzbekistan was the “bully” of Central Asia, out to make a name for itself as the hegemone. It’s the largest nation – more than half of Central Asia’s +50 million inhabitants live in Uzbekistan – and has the largest military force among the Central Asian states. Uzbekistan military has unilaterally mined along disputed borders and cut off gas supplies to neighbors during disputes.

Uzbekistan quickly attempted to establish itself outside of Russia’s orbit, first resisting Russia’s CIS reintegration plans and later withdrawing from the CIS in 1999. After 9/11, Uzbekistan welcomed U.S. forces in the region as a snub to Russia and to allow the U.S. to fight its common enemy the Taliban.

But relations with the US turned soar after the May 13 Andijan Massacre, leading to U.S. forces being kicked out and Uzbekistan shifting instead towards China and Russia . And, now RFL reports (Nov 15) on a new treaty between Uzbekistan and Russia:

Karimov said on 14 November that he hopes the new treaty will strengthen Russia’s position in Central Asia, RIA-Novosti reported the same day. The “consolidation of Russia’s presence in Central Asia will be a reliable guarantee of peace and stability in the region” and will benefit Russia, Uzbekistan, and the rest of the world, Karimov said.

Out with the troublesome US and their human rights, in with a Russia that reaffirms Uzbekistan’s sovereignty and right to use force.

Then Kazakhstan follows up its own great game switch…
Kazakhstan always played a multi-vectored foreign policy, but is constrained geographically (its northern neighbor is Russia) and demographically (Russians are 30% of population). It has made some move towards economic independence (away from Russian pipelines) with the opening of the Sino-Kazakh pipeline and later joining the US-backed BTC. The only missing “vector” was a closer relationship with the United States.

But now after losing Uzbekistan, the US has unabashedly embraced Kazakhstan:

“We are not ashamed to say that the U.S. has strategic interests in the region,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza told the Chamber. “These interests were not just military, he said: America also had an interest in Kazakh fossil fuels and in promoting democracy in the region.”

Unlike its relationship with Uzbekistan, the US from the start has attempted to maintain its position as a reformer for democracy despite closer ties with the despotic government of Kazakhstan. President Nursultan Nazerbayev has ruled Kazakhstan before the break up of the USSR and now has his daughter as the leader of an allying political party.

In Condi Rice’s trip last month to Central Asia, Rice attempted to reiterate the “US as reformer” stance by portraying Nazarbayev as a potential reformer: “The Nazarbayev government has a chance to be a real leader in Central Asia on both economic and political reform”. She also said during the trip:

America will encourage all of our friends in Central Asia to undertake democratic reforms and as they do they will solidify a lasting partnership of principle with the United States…Our goal is not to lecture our friends on how to do things the American way. Rather, we seek to help our Central Asian partners to find the stability they seek and our historical experience has taught us that stability requires legitimacy and true legitimacy requires democracy

Conclusion
The US is forced in an interesting position of needing to maintain strategic influence over the region – for counterterrorism efforts and hydrocarbon resources – while also needing to stick to its rhetoric of spreading democracy in a region that lacks it. This leaves the United States handicapped in its relationship with the Central Asian states – limiting its flexibility towards nondemocratic and in many instances repressive governments. This is a weakness that China and Russia doesnt have. Indeed, both countries stated their respect for Uzbekistan’s soverignty immediately after the Andijan Massacre.

Meanwhile, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan find themselves in a pretty good position…

While the Andijan Massacre has left Uzbekistan isolated, it seems to have quickly found new friends with the other two states that matter, Russia first and surely China next. And, assuredly, Russia will not make noise like the US does over any human rights issues in Uzbekistan.

Kazakhstan’s President Nazerbayev gets to look like a reasonable and moderate leader compared to Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan. And with the US out of options on establishing its footprint in the region, it is forced to play nice with Nazerbayev and is also hooked by its vast oil resources, as well (supposedly as large as the North Sea). Other countries in Central Asia are out of the question; Kyrgystan and Tajikistan and are not fully stable and Turkimenstan is much like a closed totaltarian state.

Kazakhstan wins in gaining a closer relationship with the US and nice PR too – “with President Nazerbayev hailed by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle as a ‘visionary leader.’”

For a supposed Great Game player, the US is holding rather weak cards against Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. So no Gen. Abizaid, the US is not playing the Great Game in Central Asia…it doesnt have the leverage to.

Here’s what Jamestown’s Andrei Smirnov has to say:

The current Chechen policy of mobilizing other Caucasian nations in the struggle against Russia is not new. The Chechens have always tried to use this strategy to weaken the Russian offensive on Chechnya and strengthen their own forces.

In 1785, Sheikh Mansur, the leader of the first organized rebellion of the Chechens against Russian domination in the region, marched with his forces to Kabarda to persuade the locals to join him and spread the anti-Russian revolt to the western part of the North Caucasus. [This largely failed]

[Smirnov goes on to mention another attempted upraising in 1846 by Imam Shamil]
…
[Contemporary] Chechen commanders did not send squadrons of Chechen militants to other regions, but instead welcomed volunteers who wanted to help the Chechens fight against Russian troops.
…
Now, there is no longer any need for Basaev to deploy Chechen groups to attack outside of Chechnya. He can go individually to any of the neighboring republics and recruit as many local men as needed to conduct a large-scale operation. This ensures that Basaev does not have to divert his Chechen forces, which immobilize the best-trained Russian troops and who are stuck in a quagmire of endless guerilla war. The new tactic allows the insurgency to open new fronts without weakening their struggle in Chechnya itself. This is the worst scenario the Russian authorities could imagine.

Conclusion
The Importance of Historical Context
This first lesson from this article is that while Islamic terrorism of the Salafist/Wahhabi/Global Guerilla kind is new, the conflicts in Chechnya and the Caucasus are not. The Caucasus has always resisted Russian rule – whether it be an imperial, soviet or other incarnation of Russia. Indeed before Russia, Chechnya was busy resisting the Ottoman Turks. Thus even without the radical Islam element, we would expect some conflict against Russian rule.

Amy Chua in “World on Fire” argues that sudden transition to free-market democracy can spark ethnic hatred – she cite’s the ethnic riots againt the Chinese in Indonesia after Suharto’s fall. While she’s speaking of a very specific case, the greater macro level analysis is the renewing and eruption of ethnic hatred once the stability of the old and iron-fisted regime is gone. For Indonesia it was Suharto and for Russia it was the fall of USSR.

True there were Chechen revolts under the USSR, but back then the Soviets could act with ruthless abandon (mass deportation) – today, this has changed with a Russia constrained by new international norms and weakened by its deteriorating state.

From Chechen Upraising to Global Guerillas
As mentioned by Smirnov, compared to centuries past, the structure of the Caucasus insurgency has changed from mainly Chechen based forces to Chechen-led forces with volunteers from throughout the Caucasus region.

From there, it isn’t much a leap to begin to see leaders beyond Basaev and Chechens, bringing forth a fully decentralized insurgency. Without a doubt, John Robb’s Bazaar of Violence will appear in Russia in full form, if it hasn’t already.

Attempting to find a political solution in Chechnya was complex enough, doing the same from the entire Caucasus may prove impossible.

Related StrategyUnit Links:
- Guerilla War in Kabardino-Balkaria , Another Chechnya Erupts
- Green Revolution in Russia – Part II
- Nalchik Raid- Russian Civil War in the Caucasus

From Reuters:

Russian oil output could peak at more than 510 million tonnes annually in 2010, or 10.2 million barrels per day (bpd), Russian Energy Minister Victor Khristenko said on Monday.

“It will reach a certain plateau of production within the time frame of 2010,” Khristenko told reporters. That plateau would be about 510 to 520 million tonnes a year, he said, or the equivalent of about 10.2 to 10.4 million bpd. In September, Russia produced 9.53 million bpd, which was a post-Soviet high, according to Energy Ministry data.

And let’s not forget that Russia currently is neck-and-neck with the Saudi’s on oil production:

Russia is chasing Saudi Arabia’s title as the world’s top crude oil producer. Saudi Arabia pumped 9.6 million bpd of crude oil in September, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

But unlike the Middle East’s oil giant, which chooses not to pump at full capacity, Russia is keen to see production hit record highs. Saudi Arabia has surplus capacity of up to 1.4 million bpd, according to the EIA.

More oil worries to ponder on.

Russia and China could take a step closer to forming a Eurasian military confederacy to rival NATO at a Moscow meeting of the six-member Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Wednesday, experts say.

(Source: Wikipedia. Blue = Member, Green = Observer)

Pretty scary stuff, eh? Its an enticing leading paragraph, but the truth is a little milder.

Brief History of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
The Shanghai Five, as it was originally called, was originally comprised of China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and founded in 1996; it was later renamed the Shanghai Co-operation Organization, when Uzbekistan joined in 1999. Originally established to counter Islamic terrorist threats located in the Western China and its neighboring countries, SCO has increasingly become a vehicle to:

• further China’s quest for securing oil resources;
• enhance its role as a major player in regional security;
• and, to a lesser extant, as a united Sino-Russian bloc against growing U.S. presence in the region.

(From an old paper of mine)

Common Interests
Between China and Russia (the twin-pillars by which SCO stand), the obvious interest is blocking U.S. influence the Central Asia – which grow greatly after 9/11 with US forces, especially in with bases Afghanistan, Uzbekistan (recently kicked out), Kyrgyzstan and not to mention NATO bases. China is uncomfortable with U.S. forces so nearby and Russia sees the sight of American might occupying former Soviet military bases in Central Asia as a supreme insult.

Specifically, China has been hungry for energy resources (oil and gas) in Central Asia; American presence and its own interests for energy is a competing threat. But recently, the Neoconservative/Democracy-Push of the Bush Administration has rushed along another concern for China and Russia:

“Russia and China feel that the U.S. has been too aggressive in Central Asia,” Lai said. “The U.S. is threatening their national security. The first thing is the U.S. is trying to put [forward] the democratic movements, some kind of people’s movements, and propel them into power and then, hopefully, these new governments would be pro-U.S.”

China, in particular, was nervous that the people’s revolution in Kyrgyzstan in March might prove infectious — not just in former Soviet Central Asia but also in its own province of Xinjiang, where there is a strong movement for independence among ethnic Uyghurs.
(RFE Link, Oct 2005)

Obstacles towards SCO as NATO
Looking at the map above and keeping in mind the raw resources of the Central Asian states plus Russia and China, SCO can look like an intimidating bloc. Yet most of the countries, while resource rich like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are but minor players in the world scene with most folks not being able to find these countries on the map.

Indeed as James Joyner alludes to, SCO with Russia and China does not mirror the powerful, rich and western NATO bloc. All but two countries (Japan and Russia) in the G-8 is a member of NATO, and Russia only being in G-8 as a token gift for Yeltsin’s reforms.

“The rationale behind this is understandable but it comes from a position of weakness, not strength. Russia and China both have far more to gain by being on the good side of the United States and benefiting from free trade with the world’s biggest economy than by forming a weak but antagonistic alliance. “(James Joyner, Oct 2005)

Obviously, it is a China and Russia that run the SCO show, but even they have a brittle relationship. Even CSM which begins with its foreboding leading article tampers down the mood towards the end of its article:

While the SCO’s potential looks vast on paper, experts say internal rivalries would preclude it from evolving into a NATO-like security bloc. “What kind of allies could Russia and China be?” says Akady Dubnov, an expert with the Vremya Novostei newspaper. “The main question for them in Central Asia is who will gain the upper hand.”

Indeed, a part of Russia believe in the “Yellow Scare” – the invasion of the “Mongol horde”, bringing a China that borders Korea and Japan at one end and Ukraine on the other. The fear is more of the far east siberian territories being overrun by Chinese migration than actual war. The resource rich far east siberia only has 6-8 million Russians with that number declining, with ~60-80 million Chinese nearby at the other side of the border.

The influx of Chinese migrant workers has become a topical issue in some Central Asian states as well as in Russia’s Siberia, under populated but rich in natural resources. According to Russia’s Interior Ministry, every year more than 500,000 Chinese “tourists” come to Russia, but not all of them return to China, staying on illegally.

Russian officials and politicians have long voiced concern over the alleged influx of illegal aliens from “far abroad”, mainly China. There are more than a million Chinese illegal migrants in Russia, according to Russia’s Interior Ministry. Last April, Russia and China signed a consular agreement aimed at regulating migration.
(CDI Weekly Link, May 2002)

Russia has also recently snubbed China over the recent project for building an oil pipeline to the Asian Market. China and Japan both competed for the bid; while no deal is finalized until the pipes are laid, Russia did choose for the building of a pipeline to cater to the Japanese with their help. Thus, despite the recent show of military cooperation in the form of exercises between Russia and China, when it comes to putting money where their mouths are, Russian opt for Japan over China.

Beyond Russia and China, the Central Asian states are not eager to fully fall in line with both with Russia and China’s interests. Indeed, as smaller states it is in their interests to pursue a multi-vector policy of playing Russia, China and the United states against each other.

Kazakhstan’s Nazerbayev has been the most vocal voice of championing a multi-vectored foreign policy and avoid reliance on a single power, be it Russia, China or the US. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have followed in Kazakhstan’s approach. See more on this at Radio Free Europe, “Central Asia: A Year In Review “.

For Russia: Less Dugin, More Primakov

No article on Central Asia and the former Soviet-Space is seemingly complete without quoting Alexander Dugin, one of the most extreme advocates of Eurasianism. Thus, CS Monitor closes its article with the following:

“It’s very important that regional powers are showing the will to resolve Eurasian problems without the intrusion of the US,” says Alexander Dugin, chair of the International Eurasian Movement, whose members include leading Russian businessmen and politicians. “Step by step we’re building a world order not based on the unipolar hegemony of the US.”
(Christian Science Monitor, Link Oct 2005)

Alexander Dugin has always taken a anti-West (cultural, political and economic) stance and believed the need to “restore” and impose a Monroe Doctrine of a Eurasian sphere under Russia. But Russia’s involvement with SCO is not about creating Durgin’s Eurasian Dream, but rather the Primakov Doctrine: The need for Russia to restore its geopolitical status and role in the world by actively seeking built a multi-polar world with Russia as one of its pole. Unlike Dugin, Primakov sees the need to cooperate with the West to help rebuild Russia’s power, but unlike the Westerners Primakov doesn’t see the need to bend to the every whim of the West.

While Russia does seek closer ties with China, it will not sacrifice important economic and strategic links with the West to do so. What it seeks is to restore its Great Power status by actively engaging all important states and regions in the world, which not only include China but the U.S., Europe, the Middle East and so on.

The United States should keep a watchful eye in the SCO alliance and indeed should continue to push for observer status in the SCO, as it has been. And while the US (true or not) continue to seemingly push for democratic revolutions in Central Asia and the Caucasus, it must make some gesture to show it does not want to destabilize China or Russia nor alienate them from Central Asia.

Big Questions Remaining
The big question is what happens if India (which has been asking) joins SCO? And what about the other organizations existing in the area, such as the Eurasian Economic Community? More to come…

Key quote from a Russian legislator:

“It was more like a mutiny, an attempt to seize power in the city, and we should label it properly.” Ilyukhin added that the Russian security agencies cannot guarantee that there won’t be a repetition of the Nalchik events somewhere else in the North Caucasus and that the situation in the region, in his opinion, has no military solution.

From the Duma Security Committee member Viktor Ilyukhi, after meeting with the Interior Minister, the Director of the FSB and others on Nalchik
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 9, No. 198, Part I, 20 October 2005)

Jamestown’s round-up confirms that Nalchik is part of a wider guerilla war, albeit still in its early stages, at least for Kabarindo-Balkaria:

With few causalities, the rebels will be able to continue their attacks in Kabardino-Balkaria. In fact, guerilla warfare has already started in the republic. On October 17, Camagat, the website of the rebels from Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia, reported fierce fighting between insurgents and federal troops near Kenzhe village, in the outskirts of Nalchik. The next day the authorities admitted that a special operation was underway near Kenzhe to search for fighters who use the settlement as a base (Interfax, October 18). Kavkazsky Uzel reported that gunmen attacked the police special-task unit (OMON) headquarters in Iskozh district of Nalchik on October 17. The same day NTV said that there was an attack on a police checkpoint manned by troops from Rostov-on-Don, a detachment sent to Nalchik to reinforce local troops (NTV, October 18). On October 18, Camagat again reported clashes in Nalchik and Baksan, a village in the north of the republic. The website also said that policemen had taken several female hostages in the Balkar village of Bilim in Elbrus mountain district. They want to exchange the women for the husbands.

It is difficult to say whether a long-term guerilla war by Kabardinian insurgents will undermine the authorities, but the operation seems to be quit real. Putin may soon find himself in another quagmire like the ongoing one in Chechnya.

Andrew Smirnov, Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Monitor, 10/20/05, V. 2, Issue, 195

For Putin, I am sure this is setting off alarm bells. Russia has always fead a domino-effect resulting from an independent Chechnya. If Moscow doesnt find a socio-political solution, but instead relies (in Putin’s words) to act “ruthlessly” against the insurgents – Russia will see itself losing all of the Caucasus in 10-20 years.