Many should know by the the issue involving White House censorship of the Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann’s New York Times Op-Ed (see image on left).

I have no issue regarding the prepublication review by the CIA’s Publication Review Board to ensure to classified information are directly or indirectly disclosed, but both Leverett and Mann claims that this was not the case.

While many bloggers have covered this issue, there appears to be a lack of discussion on what Leverett and Mann’s recommendation on Iran actual is and also a lack of this discussion from more right-moderate to conservative blogs, which I feel that StrategyUnit (at least in this current political climate) appears to be in. So here’s StrategyUnit’s attempt to address this deficiency…

Comparing Leverett-Mann’s Op-Ed with Abraham D. Sofaer’s WSJ Article

Regardless if the White House needlessly censored the Leverett-Mann Op-Ed or not, the contents of its thought and position on US foreign policy vis-a-vis Iran make for an interesting comparison to Abraham Sofaer’s WSJ article: “A Reagan Strategy: The right way to negotiate with Syria and Iran.” Sofaer is the former legal adviser to the George Shultz under Reagan.

Abraham Sofaer’s Guide on Engaging Iran/Syria based on Soviet Union

• Regime acceptance. No talk of regime change.
• Limited linkage. Minimal linkage on issues of human rights, regional issues etc “enabling negotiations to proceed while the U.S. responded firmly through deeds”
• Rhetorical restraint. To help allow the Soviety “avoid being seen as capitulating to U.S. demands.”
• Self-interest. negotiating based on “convincing the Soviets to act in their own best interests”

Leverett-Mann’s New York Times Op-Ed on Iran

Iran will only cooperate with the United States, whether in Iraq or on the nuclear issue, as part of a broader rapprochement addressing its core security concerns.
…
This requires extension of a United States security guarantee — effectively, an American commitment not to use force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic — bolstered by the prospect of lifting United States unilateral sanctions and normalizing bilateral relations.

While Abarham Sofaer focuses more on Syria than Iran, both Leverett-Mann’s and Sofaer make the simple point:

Diplomacy and negotiations can potentially work when both parties can compromise and address each other’s security needs and mutually convince and demonstrate the benefit of cooperation. The United States – as far as we know publicly – has not done that with either Iran or Syria.

Another question to consider is, even if the Bush Administration takes head to Sofaer, Leverett and Mann’s recommendations, does the Bush Administration have the mandate in Washington and the Middle East to do so? Or is this a sitting-duck presidency until 2008?

Summary
While intentional or not, Israel’s incursion into Lebanon (aimed at Hezbollah) is now a proxy war against Iran via Hezbollah and Hamas, a violent mirroring of the US-Iran maneuverings in the UN and in Iraq. The incursion also demonstrates how powerful the Iranian hand is with Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Sadr and others in Iraq and influence in Afghanistan, relative to the U.S. and Israel and even the other Middle Eastern states like Egypt or Saudi Arabia.

Israel’s endgame is not clear, as it cannot militarily defeat Hezbollah unless it shuts down Syria’s border with Lebanon (along with a conventional ground offensive), which would bring Syria into an open conflict with Israel, as well as, Israel incurring the wrath of the region and the world for widening the war.

Being a guerilla force, Hezbollah can take the blows of the IDF very resiliently. Even with infrastructure degraded and supplies gone, Hezbollah can afford to wait and rebuild slowly and even bring Israel into wider protracted war on Lebanese territory. Indeed, as long as the border between Syria and Lebanon remains open, Hezbollah will have a safe-haven for retreat as well an area to gather supplies.

A far worst case scenario is for the Lebanese government and the military to throw its weight behind Hezbollah. This is something it has not clearly done yet, but if the war widens and causalities mount, Israel may find itself in an open war against an Iranian-backed Lebanese-Syrian front on the north and Hamas in the east.

One possible end game is for Israel is to find, rescue and bring home the two IDF soldiers, granting Israel the ability to withdraw while saving face abroad and more importantly at home.

The better solution would be to use the Lebanese incursion as a platform to pressure Lebanon, the U.S. and others to finally act on fulfilling UN Resolution 1559, disarming Hezbollah.

To lay the ground work, Israel must make it explicitly clear that its offensive maneuvering is an attack on Hezbollah, not the Lebanese people, the government – which rules out the bombings in Beirut and other major Lebanese cities. It should attempt to clandestinely reach out to the fragile Lebanese government led by Prime Minister Fuad Saniora, pushing it to deploy its army against Hezbollah in the south in the name of “reasserting” control of the south.

While a realistic assessment of the current situation forbids such an optimistic assessment, there is some truth when Kyle Spector of Foreign Policy declares:

“But some Lebanese and other Arabs around the region (including the Saudis), while obviously not in favor of the Israeli assault, are seeing this crisis as a death knell for Hezbollah and quietly cheering it on”

This is not a guaranteed death kneels for Hezbollah as Spector calls it, but the dislike of Hezbollah in Lebanon and regionally is there – Israel needs to take advantage of it.

At the same time, US and its partners must work via to diplomatic channels – be it public, the UN or other channels – to get Syria and Iran to back-off. How is another question, but it must be done as alternative scenarios are dire.

Perhaps the second option is being carried out by US, Israel and its allies. Time will tell what paths history will take.

Some Suggested Readings

• NYT’s “Israel’s Invasion, Syria’s War” by Michael Young
• “Crisis in the Middle East: Local Bloggers Report” by The Truth Laid Bear

How Did We Get Here?
The Kidnapping

Israel is a tiny nation the size of New Jersey of 6 million people, which as “Fortress Israel” feels constantly threatened by far larger, greater Arab population that surrounds the tiny nation.

In this context, Hezbollah attack and kidnapping of two IDF soldiers was not just a bold and brazen raid but is seen as direct threat on Israel. In Israel, nearly all citizens do double duty in the Israeli military, so the kidnapping was not “just” of soldiers but also that of Israeli civilians.

The unfortunate issue is that:

• The kidnapping of the two IDF soldiers by Hezbollah was pure carelessness on the part of their respective IDF commanders. They should have had better force protection.
• While it is understandable that Israel sees the kidnapping of the two soldiers as leading toward an existential threat to Israel itself, in truth it is not. Israel had the option to act with more restraint and still not appear weak.

The Disarming of Hezbollah

During the G-8 Summit, Russian President Putin, and G-8 chair, declared “[It] is our impression that aside from seeking to return the abducted soldiers, Israel is pursuing wider goals.” While Putin did not elaborate, Israel is seeking to self-implement UN Resolution 1559, which declares for the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Jerusalem Post reports that Israeli officials are looking to Lebanon’s Government to go with Israel and assert control on Hezbollah-controlled South Lebanon:

The officials noted positively that Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Saniora had said Saturday at a press conference that his government would reassert government authority over all Lebanese territory – an allusion to the possibility of deploying the Lebanese army in south Lebanon, which is effectively controlled by Hizbullah.

It is unclear whether Israel thinks it can disarm Hezbollah on its own, which is foolish considering Iran and Syria’s backing and the lack of active support from the Lebanese Government. Israel could be forcing world leaders to act to enforce UN Resolution 1559 and create momentum to disarm Hezbollah, but at the high risk of the conflict.

Analysis
Iran is now clearly the key and dominant player in the Middle East. The current Israeli strikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon shows the limits of Israeli power and the weakness of the US position and inability to act to resolve this conflict.

Israel and the US are applying all their power and influence right now in the region with dismal results thus far. Hezbollah, Syria and Iran still have many resources and options, esp. with Iran still having many cards to play in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Syria and in Hezbollah and Hamas in Palestine.

Even with a ground invasion to hammer Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, Israel cannot win this war in any military terms against Hezbbollah unless it eliminates all potential supporters – that is, the use of genocide. Hezbollah is, as John Robb calls it, a “Guerrilla Proto-State“, will simply revert back to a guerilla force under Israeli pressure, but a guerilla force backed Syria and Iran, with the potential to bring in the Lebanon government on its side. (Additionally, Iran wields wide influence in Iraq and, to a lesser extant, in Palestine via Hamas.)

Indeed, Hezbollah is a guerilla army and is suited to be resilient against possible ground invasion Israel maybe contemplating. As long as Syrian-Lebanese borders remain open, no amount of destruction on Lebanese infrastructure and Hezbollah supplies would stop Syrian support and supplies coming across the border in to Lebanon.

Thus far, Arabs have been either quiet or blaming Hezbollah/Iran for the current conflict, which appears particularly surprising when its Saudi Arabiaa:

“A distinction must be made between legitimate resistance and uncalculated adventures undertaken by elements inside (Lebanon) and those behind them without recourse to the legal authorities and consulting and coordinating with Arab nations,” a statement published on the official news agency SPA said.

“These elements should bear the responsibility for their irresponsible actions and they alone should end the crisis they have created.”

But how long can this possibly last?

A Way Out

For now, Israel still has the initiative but soon Israel will be on the defensive politically and weakened militarily:

• If Israel does not end this decisively or if the situation deteriorates with more civilian casualties Israel will been harshly condemned internationally, more so than now, bringing with it isolation and further restraint in its ability to militarily and politically maneuver.
• Secondly, Israel risks bring brought in to a long protracted war that could solidify the Lebanese behind Hezbollah (something not true now) and reassert and strengthen Syrian and Iranian hand in Lebanon and the region. Israel could become exhausted militarily, as Hezbollah and Hamas gain strength via Iran and Syria. This would be of tragic consequence to Israel.

  While protesting against Israel, the Lebanon Government also has not come behind Hezbollah, but it can occur if the conflict draws out for too long. What would be the tipping point for the Lebanese military to join ranks with Hezbollah? Does anyone know?

For Israel, and indeed the world, there are only two outcomes that would bring some resolution:

• If Israel is able to find, release and return the kidnapped IDF soldiers, Israel would be able to withdraw and save face internationally and perhaps more importantly domestically.
• If Israel was able to bring the US, Lebanon and the UN together to decisively act on Hezbollah and Syria, with the end-point being a process of disbarment as per UN Resolution 1559. This would bring true independence for Lebanon, security for Israel and a major blow to Iran and Syria.

The situation on the found is still fluid but any day the events can radically swing in many directions. The World Waits.

Italy: Prime Silvio Minsiter Berlusconi’s lost in April’s elections has paved the way for Romano Prodi to take lead as the succeeding Prime Minister. Prodi has discussed pulling out the 2,700 Italian troops (3rd largest contingent in Iraq). The latest targeting against Italian troops in Iraq will expedite such moves; indeed, CounterTerrorBlog discusses that Al-Qaida hopes to bully Italy to withdraawing, doing what it did against Spain with.

US: Mid-term elections are coming around very soon for the US, leaving many Republican nervous. With President Bush hitting every lower and lower approval ratings and increased Republican-infighting, we should expect Democrats to make gains against the Republicans. If they will recapture Congress is not known, but things can only get worse for the Republicans – and so the support for the Iraq War will suffer.

The Consequences
The fourth largest contingent of forces, from South Korea, are already beginning their partial pullout, paring down “1,000 of its 3,200 soldiers remaining in the country” by the end of this year. Italy, with the coming establishing of Prodi’s government, will most likely pull out its forces out of Iraq perhaps by the end of the year. The UK, American’s venerable ally, could be next when Prime Minister Tony Blair steps down. A very scary situation for supporters of the Iraq War.

With the “Coalition of the Willing” already mocked for its lack of many major powers, the list of nations (listed by the Coalition’s web site) will look even thinner.

Shakeup in the CIA, raising oil prices and the Iran Crisis are putting President Bush in an ever weaker position in the mainstream press and the masses (as the polls show). As more announcements on withdrawals will be announced, support of the war will fall into an ever deeper lull.

Still, the StrategyPage still looks pretty optimistic over the conditions in Iraq:

“[Violence] keeps the foreign journalists happy, but the local reporters are more concerned with the street crime and corrupt government officials…Most of the patrols and raids are now conducted by Iraqi troops, who are well aware of the fact that they are still fighting Saddam.”

But the overall feeling Americans and the world will have is “if the US is wining the war in Iraq, why is everyone pulling out? Abandoning the US?” The counterpoint that the more successful Iraqi government troops continue to be the more the Coalition Forces can step down will sound too convenient of an answer.

While the US has been and needs to slowly withdrawing some troops from Iraq as Iraqi Government forces standup, US withdrawal under media and public calls for an immediate pullout may only embolden and encourage the insurgents and US enemies.

While not perfect analogies, British troops remained in Malaysia for over 10 years to quell the Communist rebellion and similar numbers of years were spent by US forces in the 1899–1913 Philippine Insurrection (though with a high cost of civilian life). A better analogy is that Japan did not receive its sovereignty from the Allies until 1952.

We are only in Year 3 of the Post-Saddam Iraq Era. While the world and even the US public will increase pressure on withdrawing US forces, we need to remember that the Iraq Project is a long term project – longer than a single election cycle – and will have a profound effect on the Middle East, the World and most importantly the Iraqi People for generations to come. It is sad irony that elections in the democracies of the UK, Italy et al may imperil democracy in Iraq.

For a view supporting “Cut and Run” from Iraq, see Lt. Gen. William E. Odom’s article “ Cut and Run? You Bet” in Foreign Policy, May/June 2006.

Back in January, StrategyUnit posted the article “Iran Crisis: Another War for Oil, Bourse and the US Dollar?” on the scheduled March opening of Iranian oil exchange (bourse), which is based on euros rather than US dollars:

This has fueled (no pun intended) speculation of the real cause of the Iranian crisis. The Iraq War has been criticized as a “War for Oil”. And now, as a second act, there are folks from Daily Kos to Asia Times saying the same of the Iran Crisis. The most aggressive promoter of this view appears to be from Krassimir Petrov.

Indeed, DailyKos writters has also been furthering the Iranian Bourse conspiracy:

“Of course most of the saber-rattling is over Iran’s nuclear program and the word “bourse” is never mentioned. But the IAEA has consistently stated that Iran is in full compliance with its regulations and the conditions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That doesn’t negate Iran’s political alignment and support for terrorism, but their nuclear energy program is hardly the threat it’s made out to be.

Only time will tell whether regime change is in the cards for Iran, especially at the hands of the United States. But the Fed’s quiet decision to no longer print the M3 is definitely quite ominous.”

Yet, interestingly recently (Feb 24) a writter on DailyKos, Jerome a Paris, writes to counter the other DailyKos writters:

“Crazy scenarios involving Iran’s purported attempts to create an oil bourse to start selling oil in euros make the rounds regularly, and even get recommended with alacrity on DKos.

These things WILL NOT HAPPEN, and we have, as a supposedly reality-based community, to focus on real issues and not imaginary ones.

So let me explain why an Iranian oil bourse will not work for the foreseeable future. I hope that this diary can be used as a handy reference when this crops up again in the future.
…
So, say that Iran decides to sell its oil in euros. Fine. Both the Iranians and their clients will determine the price for the transaction in dollars, on one of the established markets, and will trade these dollars for euros for the actual payment operation. It will give banks active on the forex markets a little bit of income, but will change nothing to how oil is traded.
…
So please, let’s stop the fantaisies, or the conspiracy theories about a switch to euros or a new bourse. If any transaction, whether by Saddam, the Iranians or anyone else is expressed in euros, it is purely cosmetic. The underlying market is in dollars, and will remain that way.

We are badly undermining the credibility of the site by recommending silly scaremongering stories on that topic.”

Indeed. Read the whole thing here.

Congrats to Jerome a Paris and DailyKos for keeping the balance.

Weighing the Concequences: Doing some Bombing v. Just Doing Nothing
Note that the “Doing Some Bombing” concequences are mostly short-term issues, while “Just Doing Nothing” are long term issues.

What’s Realistic from the List Above?
From the “Bomb Iran” column, I believe that the question of how Iranians would react is the most iffy one. The regime has no support, but would attacks really rally Iranian support around their hated government? Or will they blame the government for the war and demonstrate? But everything else – the destabalization of Iraq, Lebanon and Israel (?) to causing oil prices to sky rocket – are definately “on the menu” if the US and its allies strike against Iran.

From the “Leave Iran Alone” column, I think that the first one – “get nukes and use’em” – makes no sense. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may sound crazy but you dont get to be the national leader without being intelligent or at least have a lot of smart and powerful backers that are the real bosses behind the scenes. Also, any open use of nuclear weapons would be suicidal for the Iranian state and as much as suicide bombers like to kill themselves, I dont that everyone in the Iranian military and in other powerful positions believe in putting their own lives on the line like that.

The greatest risk is that a nuclear Iran will spread it know-how and pass a nuclear weapon to a third-party group like Al-Qaida. But how high is this risk? Proliferation, as we have learned via A.Q.Khan virtually unstoppable, so how confident are we that the proper investment in intelligence and WMD detection systems can help tremendously lower the risk of a loose Iranian nuke detonating in Antwerp or anywhere near a cargoship at a Western port city?

Conclusion: No Easy Choice
The fact of the matter is that doing something and doing nothing both lead to very bad outcomes. Strikes against Iran has immediate short-term concequences, but the doing nothing have severe long term concequences. I honestly cannot offer any good recommendations on paths to take – faced with these set of binary choices the U.S. is in a lose-lose situation.

Beyond Binary: Thomas Barnett’s So-Crazy-It-Might-Just-Work Idea

Turning to Thomas Barnett, as StrategyUnit appearingly so often does, we get an interesting third-choice with Iran. He proves that when you dont like either choices, you try to make you own – a third way. Barnett’s recommendation is to try a path towards thoughtful engagement with Iran, but its one long hell of a Hail Mary:

So if Tehran is going to get the bomb no matter what, the question shifts from “What can the United States do to prevent it?” to “What does the United States get out of it?”

If Iran was our natural security partner in the past for a lot of good reasons, then most of those reasons remain today, simply obscured by the continuing dictatorship of the mullahs (of which we have some very bad memories).

Our natural goal with Iran, then, is to marginalize that religious leadership while capturing the same security partnership we once enjoyed.
…
Our grand bargain with Iran is not hard to imagine. Iran gets the bomb, diplomatic recognition, the lifting of sanctions and the opening of trade, and its removal from the axis of evil.

In return, what Iran must offer the United States is long-term support for both the two state solution in Palestine and a stable Iraq dominated by a Shiite majority, the cessation of its support for terrorist groups in the region, joint pressure on Syria for an end to its hegemony over Lebanon (removing their troops is only a nice start) and — most symbolically — its recognition of Israel diplomatically and its formal declaration of that country’s right to exist.
…
Tell me, since Iran is getting the bomb anyway eventually, would you feel less comfortable about this possible scenario if Iran were to open up to the West or if it remained isolated and surrounded by hostile American troops?

In which scenario do you think Tehran might risk it all by sponsoring a terrorist WMD strike against Israel or the West — when it has something to lose or nothing to lose? If America wants Iran to act responsibly in the region, it needs to give Iran some responsibility for regional security.

The downside is that such a path would make the US and the West weak (the paper tiger) in the eyes of the world and without any promise that Iran will fulfill its part of the deal. It hopes to wedge between the conservative Iranians who welcome an economic opening with the West and the non-compromising hardliners. But will such – dare I say “appeasement” - work? If it fails do we still have the opportunity to strike Iran? How do we know when it fails and can we convince the world it has?

Barnett hasnt provided any answers for this yet, but his suggestion is worth a serious look if only because the other two paths we have are so undesireable.

Introduction to the US Dollars/Oil Bourse Conspiracy

Iran is scheduled in March to launch an oil exchange with the currency used for transaction being Euros as opposed to US dollars, such as in the two main oil bourse, International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) in London and the NYTMEX in New York.

This has fueled (no pun intended) speculation of the real cause of the Iranian crisis. The Iraq War has been criticized as a “War for Oil”. And now, as a second act, there are folks from Daily Kos to Asia Times saying the same of the Iran Crisis. The most aggressive promoter of this view appears to be from Krassimir Petrov:

The economic essence of this [post Bretton Woods] arrangement was that the dollar was now backed by oil. As long as that was the case, the world had to accumulate increasing amounts of dollars, because they needed those dollars to buy oil. As long as the dollar was the only acceptable payment for oil, its dominance in the world was assured, and the American Empire could continue to tax the rest of the world. If, for any reason, the dollar lost its oil backing, the American Empire would cease to exist. Thus, Imperial survival dictated that oil be sold only for dollars.
…
The Iranian government has finally developed the ultimate “nuclear” weapon that can swiftly destroy the financial system underpinning the American Empire. That weapon is the Iranian Oil Bourse slated to open in March 2006.

Prior to the Iraq War, Saddam Hussein switched the currency of choice for oil transaction from US dollars to Euros. Many saw the Iraq War as a conspiracy to stop and discourage the currency switch as the motivation for the Iraq War and are now predicting the same for Iran nuclear crisis. Indeed, a quick Google search will present a whole list of sites supporting this view.

Economists Rebuttal

Both economists Tyler Cowen and James Hamilton, in their respective blogs, counter such claims of a US collapse as simplistic view of economics.

Here below are excerpts from James Hamilton’s view on the Bourse issue:

On Dollar Assets and Oil Transactions

[Even] if the oil were purchased with dollars drawn on a U.S. bank, there is no reason at all that the seller needs to retain the proceeds in that form. Those selling oil could convert those dollars back to euros or Japanese yen or whatever their hearts desired, and likewise could convert euros obtained through sales on an Iranian bourse back into dollars, if they wished. What ultimately determines the demand for dollars is not the unit of account for the transaction, but rather the desired asset holdings of those who are accumulating the wealth.

On “US Dollars ‘Backed by Oil’”

And the notion that the U.S. dollar is currently “backed by oil” is so nonsensical that it is difficult even to fathom what that phrase is intended to convey….[If] you surrender dollars on any given day in January 2006, how much oil are you going to get back? It varies literally by the minute, and the rate at which dollars get exchanged for oil has nothing to do with the promises made by any government and everything to do with market fluctuations in supply and demand.

Conclusion
As the date draws closer to March 2006, we should expect the Iranian Oil Bourse conspiracy to grow even louder and to gain an increasingly foothold in the imagination of the many. However, both Tyler Cowen and James Hamilton seemed to have taken a very clear counter against such claims as simplistic and implausible.

On the true nature of the Iran crisis, it is difficult to tell. StrategyUnit last post attempt to unravel this enigma in the context of Iraq, but StratFor’s analysis seems to be the most accurate (or at least plausible) so far:

If the Iranians are seen as getting too close to a weapon, either the United States or Israel will take them out, and there is an outside chance that the facilities could not be taken out with a high degree of assurance unless nukes are used. In the past, our view was that the Iranians would move carefully in using the nukes to gain leverage against the United States. That is no longer clear. Their focus now seems to be not on their traditional diplomacy, but on a more radical, intra-Islamic diplomacy. That means that they might welcome a (survivable) attack by Israel or the United States. It would burnish Iran’s credentials as the true martyr and fighter of Islam.

Meanwhile, the Iranians appear to be reaching out to the Sunnis on a number of levels. Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of a radical Shiite group in Iraq with ties to Iran, visited Saudi Arabia recently. There are contacts between radical Shia and Sunnis in Lebanon as well. The Iranians appear to be engaged in an attempt to create the kind of coalition in the Muslim world that al Qaeda failed to create. From Tehran’s point of view, if they get a deliverable nuclear device, that’s great — but if they are attacked by Israel or the United States, that’s not a bad outcome either.

In short, the diplomacy that Iran practiced from the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war until after the U.S. invasion of Iraq appears to be ended. Iran is making a play for ownership of revolutionary Islamism on behalf of itself and the Shia. Thus, Tehran will continue to make provocative moves, while hoping to avoid counterstrikes. On the other hand, if there are counterstrikes, the Iranians will probably be able to live with that as well.

(Source: George Friedman , Iran’s Redefined Strategy”, Strategic Forcasting: Geopolitical Intelligence Report, 17 January 2006.)
Emphasis Mine.

In the Wretchard’s “The Coming of the Bomb” at Belmont Club, he excerpts from the US Army War College’s “Getting Ready For A Nuclear-Ready Iran” monograph:

“[An] ever more nuclear-ready Iran will try to lead the revolutionary Islamic vanguard throughout the Islamic world by becoming the main support for terrorist organizations aimed against Washington’s key regional ally, Israel; America’s key energy source, Saudi Arabia; and Washington’s prospective democratic ally, Iraq.”

The Wretchard extends this analysis to declare, “It could mark the final end of efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and provide Islamic terrorism with a nuclear deterrent.”

If the prediction above holds true than the Iraqi project will fail before it even has a chance to really succeed. The great hope for the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was to help galvanize democracy and openness in the Middle East with the chance to be a Shia counterweight to the mullahs in Iran and bring hope to the Iranian people by showing them an alternative route.

An emboldened nuclear Iran that would be able to leverage its nuclear power status to aggressively support Islamic terrorist organizations and would contribute to even more instability to the security environment in the Middle East and many Muslim nations.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad intentions for the nuclear weapons are still not quite clear. His extreme rhetoric has caused much alarm and, indeed, the cause of the escalation of the crisis. Here are just some possible motives:
1) Deterrent against the US. The US surrounds Iran on three sides: Iraq in the west, Afghanistan in the south, and in the Persian Gulf where the US superior naval forces can be sent.
2) To generate a crisis that will consolidate Ahmadinejad’s political base? This would be in line with his stark political rhetoric, which has captured the political discourse.
3) Leverage to propel Iranian Republic as the revolutionary vanguard of Islam (despite the Shi’a vs. Sunni differences)?

I don’t think we have enough information on this to move beyond such speculation and until the only logical route with Iran is through engagement, exchanging the world’s acquiesce of Iran’s nuclear development for some sort of economic openness (a way to tie and restrain Tehran’s action). Short of a risky military action or regime change, we sadly have no options left.

PS: As a side note Officer’s Club (via DefenseTech) points to a Washington Post’s article on a “bolt-out-of-the-blue” plan for rapid global strike, a supposed plan called CONPLAN 8022 that deals specifically with Iran and North Korea. Unless the world stands behind the US (with the pen and the sword), such a plan would be very unlikely.