Iraq’s non-state guerrillas aren’t mere proxies of Iran. Instead, they are largely autonomous.

First, these groups don’t rely upon Iran for their operating income since they can manufacture income through participation in black globalization’s multi-trillion dollar economy. A classic example of this is the decentralized and open source marketplace for the transnational smuggling of gasoline.

Today, New Yorks Times reports on a leaked NSC document with a view that supports Robb’s position:

The report, obtained by The New York Times, estimates that groups responsible for many of the insurgent and terrorist attacks are raising $70 million to $200 million a year from illegal activities. It says that $25 million to $100 million of the total comes from oil smuggling and other criminal activity involving the state-owned oil industry aided by “corrupt and complicit” Iraqi officials.

As much as $36 million a year comes from ransoms paid to save hundreds of kidnap victims in Iraq, the report said. It estimates that unnamed foreign governments — previously identified by senior American officials as including France and Italy — paid Iraqi kidnappers $30 million in ransom last year.

Open Source Bazaar and the Sustainable Ecology

Going back to John Robb, one of his themes is the idea of the “Open Source Bazaar“:

The Financiers listed above are Government Insiders, Senior Baathist, Al-Qaida, Tribal Groups and Nation-States – all of them, mostly outsiders or periphary to the Insurgent and Sectarian groups.

This has changed. While outside forces initially strengthened the position and inertia of these groups, we are now seeing a Sustainable Ecology of Iraqi Global Guerrillas
These groups are now trafficking oil and collecting money via kidnappings to sustain and regenerate their operations:

[Jeffery White] said the insurgency had demonstrated tremendous regenerative properties. “The networks fix themselves, they heal themselves,” he said. He pointed to the success of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia to withstand the loss of hundreds of combatants and dozens of major leaders. “They keep coming back,” he said, “and I think the same thing has happened to the financial system.”

The insurgents now have network and regenerative properties in recruiting personnel, leadership structure and in financing. This combined with the easily accessible explosive and weapons in the Middle East is proving very challenging against accomplishing US Objectives in Iraq.

Summary
While intentional or not, Israel’s incursion into Lebanon (aimed at Hezbollah) is now a proxy war against Iran via Hezbollah and Hamas, a violent mirroring of the US-Iran maneuverings in the UN and in Iraq. The incursion also demonstrates how powerful the Iranian hand is with Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Sadr and others in Iraq and influence in Afghanistan, relative to the U.S. and Israel and even the other Middle Eastern states like Egypt or Saudi Arabia.

Israel’s endgame is not clear, as it cannot militarily defeat Hezbollah unless it shuts down Syria’s border with Lebanon (along with a conventional ground offensive), which would bring Syria into an open conflict with Israel, as well as, Israel incurring the wrath of the region and the world for widening the war.

Being a guerilla force, Hezbollah can take the blows of the IDF very resiliently. Even with infrastructure degraded and supplies gone, Hezbollah can afford to wait and rebuild slowly and even bring Israel into wider protracted war on Lebanese territory. Indeed, as long as the border between Syria and Lebanon remains open, Hezbollah will have a safe-haven for retreat as well an area to gather supplies.

A far worst case scenario is for the Lebanese government and the military to throw its weight behind Hezbollah. This is something it has not clearly done yet, but if the war widens and causalities mount, Israel may find itself in an open war against an Iranian-backed Lebanese-Syrian front on the north and Hamas in the east.

One possible end game is for Israel is to find, rescue and bring home the two IDF soldiers, granting Israel the ability to withdraw while saving face abroad and more importantly at home.

The better solution would be to use the Lebanese incursion as a platform to pressure Lebanon, the U.S. and others to finally act on fulfilling UN Resolution 1559, disarming Hezbollah.

To lay the ground work, Israel must make it explicitly clear that its offensive maneuvering is an attack on Hezbollah, not the Lebanese people, the government – which rules out the bombings in Beirut and other major Lebanese cities. It should attempt to clandestinely reach out to the fragile Lebanese government led by Prime Minister Fuad Saniora, pushing it to deploy its army against Hezbollah in the south in the name of “reasserting” control of the south.

While a realistic assessment of the current situation forbids such an optimistic assessment, there is some truth when Kyle Spector of Foreign Policy declares:

“But some Lebanese and other Arabs around the region (including the Saudis), while obviously not in favor of the Israeli assault, are seeing this crisis as a death knell for Hezbollah and quietly cheering it on”

This is not a guaranteed death kneels for Hezbollah as Spector calls it, but the dislike of Hezbollah in Lebanon and regionally is there – Israel needs to take advantage of it.

At the same time, US and its partners must work via to diplomatic channels – be it public, the UN or other channels – to get Syria and Iran to back-off. How is another question, but it must be done as alternative scenarios are dire.

Perhaps the second option is being carried out by US, Israel and its allies. Time will tell what paths history will take.

Some Suggested Readings

• NYT’s “Israel’s Invasion, Syria’s War” by Michael Young
• “Crisis in the Middle East: Local Bloggers Report” by The Truth Laid Bear

How Did We Get Here?
The Kidnapping

Israel is a tiny nation the size of New Jersey of 6 million people, which as “Fortress Israel” feels constantly threatened by far larger, greater Arab population that surrounds the tiny nation.

In this context, Hezbollah attack and kidnapping of two IDF soldiers was not just a bold and brazen raid but is seen as direct threat on Israel. In Israel, nearly all citizens do double duty in the Israeli military, so the kidnapping was not “just” of soldiers but also that of Israeli civilians.

The unfortunate issue is that:

• The kidnapping of the two IDF soldiers by Hezbollah was pure carelessness on the part of their respective IDF commanders. They should have had better force protection.
• While it is understandable that Israel sees the kidnapping of the two soldiers as leading toward an existential threat to Israel itself, in truth it is not. Israel had the option to act with more restraint and still not appear weak.

The Disarming of Hezbollah

During the G-8 Summit, Russian President Putin, and G-8 chair, declared “[It] is our impression that aside from seeking to return the abducted soldiers, Israel is pursuing wider goals.” While Putin did not elaborate, Israel is seeking to self-implement UN Resolution 1559, which declares for the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Jerusalem Post reports that Israeli officials are looking to Lebanon’s Government to go with Israel and assert control on Hezbollah-controlled South Lebanon:

The officials noted positively that Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Saniora had said Saturday at a press conference that his government would reassert government authority over all Lebanese territory – an allusion to the possibility of deploying the Lebanese army in south Lebanon, which is effectively controlled by Hizbullah.

It is unclear whether Israel thinks it can disarm Hezbollah on its own, which is foolish considering Iran and Syria’s backing and the lack of active support from the Lebanese Government. Israel could be forcing world leaders to act to enforce UN Resolution 1559 and create momentum to disarm Hezbollah, but at the high risk of the conflict.

Analysis
Iran is now clearly the key and dominant player in the Middle East. The current Israeli strikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon shows the limits of Israeli power and the weakness of the US position and inability to act to resolve this conflict.

Israel and the US are applying all their power and influence right now in the region with dismal results thus far. Hezbollah, Syria and Iran still have many resources and options, esp. with Iran still having many cards to play in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Syria and in Hezbollah and Hamas in Palestine.

Even with a ground invasion to hammer Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, Israel cannot win this war in any military terms against Hezbbollah unless it eliminates all potential supporters – that is, the use of genocide. Hezbollah is, as John Robb calls it, a “Guerrilla Proto-State“, will simply revert back to a guerilla force under Israeli pressure, but a guerilla force backed Syria and Iran, with the potential to bring in the Lebanon government on its side. (Additionally, Iran wields wide influence in Iraq and, to a lesser extant, in Palestine via Hamas.)

Indeed, Hezbollah is a guerilla army and is suited to be resilient against possible ground invasion Israel maybe contemplating. As long as Syrian-Lebanese borders remain open, no amount of destruction on Lebanese infrastructure and Hezbollah supplies would stop Syrian support and supplies coming across the border in to Lebanon.

Thus far, Arabs have been either quiet or blaming Hezbollah/Iran for the current conflict, which appears particularly surprising when its Saudi Arabiaa:

“A distinction must be made between legitimate resistance and uncalculated adventures undertaken by elements inside (Lebanon) and those behind them without recourse to the legal authorities and consulting and coordinating with Arab nations,” a statement published on the official news agency SPA said.

“These elements should bear the responsibility for their irresponsible actions and they alone should end the crisis they have created.”

But how long can this possibly last?

A Way Out

For now, Israel still has the initiative but soon Israel will be on the defensive politically and weakened militarily:

• If Israel does not end this decisively or if the situation deteriorates with more civilian casualties Israel will been harshly condemned internationally, more so than now, bringing with it isolation and further restraint in its ability to militarily and politically maneuver.
• Secondly, Israel risks bring brought in to a long protracted war that could solidify the Lebanese behind Hezbollah (something not true now) and reassert and strengthen Syrian and Iranian hand in Lebanon and the region. Israel could become exhausted militarily, as Hezbollah and Hamas gain strength via Iran and Syria. This would be of tragic consequence to Israel.

  While protesting against Israel, the Lebanon Government also has not come behind Hezbollah, but it can occur if the conflict draws out for too long. What would be the tipping point for the Lebanese military to join ranks with Hezbollah? Does anyone know?

For Israel, and indeed the world, there are only two outcomes that would bring some resolution:

• If Israel is able to find, release and return the kidnapped IDF soldiers, Israel would be able to withdraw and save face internationally and perhaps more importantly domestically.
• If Israel was able to bring the US, Lebanon and the UN together to decisively act on Hezbollah and Syria, with the end-point being a process of disbarment as per UN Resolution 1559. This would bring true independence for Lebanon, security for Israel and a major blow to Iran and Syria.

The situation on the found is still fluid but any day the events can radically swing in many directions. The World Waits.

Weighing the Concequences: Doing some Bombing v. Just Doing Nothing
Note that the “Doing Some Bombing” concequences are mostly short-term issues, while “Just Doing Nothing” are long term issues.

What’s Realistic from the List Above?
From the “Bomb Iran” column, I believe that the question of how Iranians would react is the most iffy one. The regime has no support, but would attacks really rally Iranian support around their hated government? Or will they blame the government for the war and demonstrate? But everything else – the destabalization of Iraq, Lebanon and Israel (?) to causing oil prices to sky rocket – are definately “on the menu” if the US and its allies strike against Iran.

From the “Leave Iran Alone” column, I think that the first one – “get nukes and use’em” – makes no sense. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may sound crazy but you dont get to be the national leader without being intelligent or at least have a lot of smart and powerful backers that are the real bosses behind the scenes. Also, any open use of nuclear weapons would be suicidal for the Iranian state and as much as suicide bombers like to kill themselves, I dont that everyone in the Iranian military and in other powerful positions believe in putting their own lives on the line like that.

The greatest risk is that a nuclear Iran will spread it know-how and pass a nuclear weapon to a third-party group like Al-Qaida. But how high is this risk? Proliferation, as we have learned via A.Q.Khan virtually unstoppable, so how confident are we that the proper investment in intelligence and WMD detection systems can help tremendously lower the risk of a loose Iranian nuke detonating in Antwerp or anywhere near a cargoship at a Western port city?

Conclusion: No Easy Choice
The fact of the matter is that doing something and doing nothing both lead to very bad outcomes. Strikes against Iran has immediate short-term concequences, but the doing nothing have severe long term concequences. I honestly cannot offer any good recommendations on paths to take – faced with these set of binary choices the U.S. is in a lose-lose situation.

Beyond Binary: Thomas Barnett’s So-Crazy-It-Might-Just-Work Idea

Turning to Thomas Barnett, as StrategyUnit appearingly so often does, we get an interesting third-choice with Iran. He proves that when you dont like either choices, you try to make you own – a third way. Barnett’s recommendation is to try a path towards thoughtful engagement with Iran, but its one long hell of a Hail Mary:

So if Tehran is going to get the bomb no matter what, the question shifts from “What can the United States do to prevent it?” to “What does the United States get out of it?”

If Iran was our natural security partner in the past for a lot of good reasons, then most of those reasons remain today, simply obscured by the continuing dictatorship of the mullahs (of which we have some very bad memories).

Our natural goal with Iran, then, is to marginalize that religious leadership while capturing the same security partnership we once enjoyed.
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Our grand bargain with Iran is not hard to imagine. Iran gets the bomb, diplomatic recognition, the lifting of sanctions and the opening of trade, and its removal from the axis of evil.

In return, what Iran must offer the United States is long-term support for both the two state solution in Palestine and a stable Iraq dominated by a Shiite majority, the cessation of its support for terrorist groups in the region, joint pressure on Syria for an end to its hegemony over Lebanon (removing their troops is only a nice start) and — most symbolically — its recognition of Israel diplomatically and its formal declaration of that country’s right to exist.
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Tell me, since Iran is getting the bomb anyway eventually, would you feel less comfortable about this possible scenario if Iran were to open up to the West or if it remained isolated and surrounded by hostile American troops?

In which scenario do you think Tehran might risk it all by sponsoring a terrorist WMD strike against Israel or the West — when it has something to lose or nothing to lose? If America wants Iran to act responsibly in the region, it needs to give Iran some responsibility for regional security.

The downside is that such a path would make the US and the West weak (the paper tiger) in the eyes of the world and without any promise that Iran will fulfill its part of the deal. It hopes to wedge between the conservative Iranians who welcome an economic opening with the West and the non-compromising hardliners. But will such – dare I say “appeasement” - work? If it fails do we still have the opportunity to strike Iran? How do we know when it fails and can we convince the world it has?

Barnett hasnt provided any answers for this yet, but his suggestion is worth a serious look if only because the other two paths we have are so undesireable.

[A] divided, chaotic, government-less Iraq is very likely to become a hornets’ nest. From it, a hundred mini-Zarqawis will spread all over the Middle East, conducting acts of sabotage and seeking to overthrow governments in Allah’s name.

While coming from one of the brightest minds in military thinking, Van Creveld’s opinion is neither unique nor shocking. But what struck me was how John Robb headlined that particular excerpt above: “Iraq in turn destabilizes the region as global guerrillas spread out.”

In the words of Thomas Barnett: Its about Connectivity, Stupid!

As mentioned in a paper I wrote, the principal argument I had made on supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom was that “U.S. intervention aiding in the creation of a liberal democratic Iraq is key in bringing not only liberalism to the region, but in essence exporting a new regime of strategic security to the Middle East.” In short, a liberal Iraq would reach out and bring economic connectivity to the stagnate Middle East region and with it a new security regime.

On the opposite end…One of the more saner arguments against the war, as Van Crevald said, was that the intervention would ultimately fail, launching hundreds of mini-Zarqawis and min-Bin Ladens all over the Middle East.

But in essence, these two arguments are the one and the same and I agree with both:
1. A free, liberal and democratic Iraq can act as a hub to further economic (and maybe even political) connectivity in the region stimulating economic growth and with it regional stability.
2. A divided, failed Iraqi state can act as a hub (a “bazaar of violence” in John Robb’s term) that will reach out to export instability to neighbouring countries while also attracting many to join Al-Qaida-related groups in Iraq.

Its about all connectivity, but different sides of the same coin. Thus, as made time and time again by many – the question is not if we will withdraw from Iraq, but as the Economist puts it “Not whether, but how, to withdraw“.

The War in Iraq is about connectivity. Originally, it was under the idealistic impression that the only connectivity possible was the championing of liberalism in the Middle East, but in the current sobering reality – we know that connectivity cuts both ways.

What connectivity will the New Iraq ultimately bring to the Middle East?

One thing for sure is, if we withdraw unilaterally now, we’ll surrender the chance for liberal connectivity.

Here’s quick Weekend Reading…just in case you need a break from all that turkey and gravy. By the way, I’ve been doing some light posting this past two weeks, but I’ll start going back to the normal beat of things soon.

OxBlog on Jame’s Fellow’s “Why Iraq Has No Army” in December’s Atlantic Monthly

David Adensik does an analysis of James Fallows’ cover story in the Atlantic monthly “Why Iraq Has No Army”. The article has caused such a buzz that even “George Stephanopoulous attempted to use the article to cross-examine Donald Rumsfeld on Sunday morning.”

I agree with David Adesnik that despite the hype of a title, Fallows doesnt really say anything new nor goes into depth about anything groundbreaking. Adesnik also the lack of definately strong position in the article (from critical/pessimistic to hawkish) as reflective of the overall difficult position of the Democrats:

“So is there a third way that will allow Democrats to both criticize the war and be seen as hawkish? Yes there is. They can click their heels three times and say “I agree with John McCain.””

The article is available for subscribers only, but if you would like a copy let me know and I can email it over. And, dont forget your local library (via online database) may carry a copy.

Oil Drum’s “There’s A New Kid In Town — Iran Versus Kazakhstan”

I’ve done an extensive research on Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and energy resources as part of my thesis in college, so its interesting (but not too surprising) to see Oil Drum’s “There’s A New Kid In Town — Iran Versus Kazakhstan” – which boldy proclaims the growing importance of Kazakhstan OVER Iran on energy resources:

Iran is still a giant and Kazakhstan is a middle tier country among the world’s oil suppliers. Iran produced 4081/kbd in 2004, 5.2% of the world’s total while Kazakhstan produced 1295/kbd, a paltry 1.6% percent of the whole. Iran has 132.5 billon barrels in proven reserves, 11.1% of the world’s total while Kazakhstan has 39.6 billion barrels, a 3.3% world share. But let’s look into our chrystal ball to see what the future may look like.
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Around the years 2008 to 2009 period, Kazakhstan is exporting more total oil supply to the OECD countries, China and (perhaps) India than Iran is (Empahsis mine)

Eurasianet’s “China joins the Central Asian Base Race”

Stephen Blank of Eurasianet writes on China’s recent move to secure a military base in Kyrgyzstan and even in Uzbekistan, which the US has recently been kicked out from.

While Blank focuses on Chinese miltiary presence on Central Asia, we should not forget the joint Chinese-Pakistan naval base in Gwadar, Pakistan.

Beijing’s search for a base has occurred against a backdrop of growing regional militarization and an intensification of great power rivalry in Central Asia. Thus, China’s requests of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, even if made sotto voce, have served to heighten the geopolitical jockeying in the region. It also suggests a growing willingness entertain the use of the military instrument to address regional issues. This cannot be considered a good sign.

While SCO (which includes Russia, China all all major Central Asian states) asked for the US militray to leave Central Asia, Blank correctly points out that Russia come out more strongly against a Chinese over a US presence in Central Asia.

In the UK: “Gas industry on brink of winter crisis”

The OilDrum and EnergyBulletin have been covering the less known natural gas issues that faces the US, UK and others, but here’s a mainstream news on UK’s winter energy crisis:

The country’s gas industry is on a knife edge this winter and could tip into crisis if there is a major breakdown in its ageing North Sea fields and pipelines, analysts said on Thursday.

Europe’s biggest consumer is fast running out of gas from the fields that once made it self sufficient and kept prices among the lowest in Europe. Today, UK gas is the world’s costliest fuel and winter supply will be the tightest in memory.Government ministers are under pressure to explain how one of the world’s richest nations has left its energy policy hostage to the weather and ageing North Sea equipment.

As part of Operation Steel Curtain, 2,500 US and 1,500 Iraqi troops were deployed to the Anbar region in a bid to secure porous Syria-Iraq borders ahead of the December elections. Tribal militias were also said to be involved to support the US-Iraqi troops. The first phase appears to be to dislodge the insurgents from Husaybah (city of 30,000) and secure the city.

Instead of launching major offensives (seemingly every three months) to “break the insurgent’s back” as we all too often hear about, the new strategy is to this is to clear a region of insurgents; deny territory and resources to insurgents; and to rebuild the region to win local support. This strategy is, of course, nothing new.

Added to this, is the inclusion of tribal militias to augment and support the Iraqi government troops in the areas that are cleared.

Clear, Hold and Rebuild
Elaine M. Grossman from Inside Washington Publishers writes a length account of change in strategy. Here is a lengthy excerpt:

The Bush administration is readying a major change to its military strategy in Iraq that will aim to better protect local populations from insurgent attack, according to U.S. officials. The planned shift reflects growing White House alarm about increased violence in Iraq and a deeper recognition that ending the insurgency will depend heavily on popular Iraqi support, these sources tell Inside the Pentagon.

For the time being, U.S. forces will continue to lead battles to rid insurgents from their strongholds in Iraq. But a new aspect of the military strategy will be to use Iraqi army troops and tribal militias to patrol those areas that have been cleared of guerrilla fighters, according to U.S. officials.

“Our military folks are considering adding ‘area security’ to the set of goals that inform the military strategy for winning the war in Iraq and for transferring responsibilities to the Iraqis,” the U.S. ambassador to that nation, Zalmay Khalilzad, told ITP this week. The envoy spoke during a Nov. 1 interview in Washington, sandwiched between meetings at the Pentagon and White House.

This is the second major change the Bush team has made to the military strategy in Iraq this year. Last spring, U.S. military leaders touted their decision to make training new Iraqi security forces the highest priority, with fighting insurgents dropping to a secondary focus.

But since then, insurgent attacks have risen to a weekly average of 600 — twice the level from early last year – and U.S. casualties in the war have surpassed 2,000. Nearly 100 Americans were killed in Iraq in October, the highest monthly casualties since January.
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Over the past few months, some uniformed officers have complained privately that the military strategy seemed adrift, lacking clear objectives or measurable progress. Military commanders in different sectors of Iraq have been left to improvise tactical objectives in fighting the insurgency, sources say.

The result, says one U.S. officer in the region, has been “chaos and confusion — and anything but an effective counterinsurgency strategy.”
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To do that, experts in counterinsurgency warfare have been urging Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his top generals in Iraq to shift their focus away from hunting down and killing insurgents, emphasizing instead an effort to better protect the population from attacks.
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“There [are] also some forces that can be made from the tribes or from local areas that could be attached to the [Iraqi] military forces, that can complement or supplement or add to the existing, more formal forces,” one U.S. official tells ITP. These tribal militias may be trained as a form of national guard authorized by the Iraqi ministry of defense, the official says.

U.S. and Iraqi military leaders have already begun cultivating tribal fighters for this purpose, but with mixed results, according to some officials in the region.

“The issue is getting them to fight insurgents outside their tribal area and for us to be aware of their hidden agendas. . . . So far, the tribal engagement strategy from a military standpoint has not [done] what it was advertised [to do],” says one officer in Iraq. “The other issue is, what do you do with an armed militia after [its] purpose has been achieved? We have never been very good at demobilization.”

Iraq as Vietnam, Again (For real this time?)
In “A Better Strategy For Iraq”, David Ignatius writes of this new strategy in the context of Vietnam. Apparently, Gen. John Abizaid to Philip Zelikow of the State Department has been reading up on “A Better War”:

“A Better War” was published in 1999. The author, Lewis Sorley, a former military and intelligence officer, drew on an extensive collection of documents and tape recordings from legendary Army warrior Gen. Creighton Abrams, who commanded U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1968 to 1972. The book’s contrarian argument is that after Abrams replaced Gen. William Westmoreland — and scuttled his “search and destroy” tactics in favor of a pacification strategy of “clear and hold” — the Vietnam War began to go right.

Indeed, Sorley argues that by early 1972 the United States had effectively won the war and could turn the fighting over to its South Vietnamese allies.

By Sorley’s account, it was politics back in America that turned victory into defeat, by blocking U.S. support for the Saigon government after North Vietnamese troops invaded the South en masse in 1974 and ‘75. (Empahsis Mine)

Closing Notes
I find it very curious that this is the real new strategy, and not just some media ploy that coincides with the usual pre-election offensive. “Clear and Hold” strategy is nothing new, but the U.S. has always lacked the appropriate number of troops to “hold and rebuild”. Indeed, the inability to use the “Clear and Hold” strategy has also been the biggest point regarding the lack of US manpower in Iraq.

The way it’s being portrayed, the strategy will be applied by using Iraqi troops (which has been steadily growing in numbers) along with Iraqi tribal militias. This year, the Bush Administration declared that the build-up of Iraqi forces would be a top priority. Perhaps, it is already bearing fruit.

While the US can “clear” a region, it will probably be up to the Iraqi government troops and tribal miltias to “secure and rebuild”. This will be a critical test for the Iraqi government and the supportive tribes. And indeed, its always been about Iraq standing and fighting on its own.

Alternatively, this maybe interpreted as more of a desperate effort to basically go ahead with what everyone knows we should have done, but lacked the troops for. We all hope not, but we wont know until later.

Debka take on Operation Steel Curtain and the new strategy in a similarly negative light:

the coalition’s “hold” on “cleared” locations is temporary for lack of manpower, while “building” is a vision that applies to Baghdad rather than the terrorist-infested al Anbar region. For now, the immediate objective is to curb terrorist and insurgent activity as far as possible for the December 15 general election. To this end, US military operations are focusing not only on al Qaeda sanctuaries around al Qaim but also across the border to choke off the traffic at source, their Syrian bases of departure.

All the same, although a Qaeda’s foreign fighters are under pressure, they continue to stream into western Iraq from Syria. Moreover, the deepening Iranian involvement in the Iraq war has not been publicly addressed except by the British in the south.

British commander of southern Iraq Maj. Gen Jim Dutton said Friday that insurgents are still getting weapons from the other side of the border – Iran.

Let’s wait and see.

As you can tell from my postings, I haven’t made much commentary regarding the situation in Iraq. This is chiefly because others (see the links on the right) already do a great job at analyzing the situation and the situation in Iraq is at many times too fluid and opaque for me to make heads or tails of it.

Here’s an example, which I pointed out in a comment at WoC, both from October 23, 2005.

This is a comment by Dan Darling, in a posting discussing the Iraqi Referendum:

I actually think that violence has been going down (at least from where it was when the insurgents started mounting attacks in a big way in April) for a longer period than that, particularly with regard to the number as well as the scope of mass casualty terrorist attacks in the country.
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That said, a drop in violence is still a drop in violence, as is the fact that a lot of Sunnis are now engaged in the political process, even as an opposition force, rather than operating outside of it. As I think Eric has noted in the past, there are definite fault lines between the various insurgent groups, some of which are far more open to political participation than others.

And over at Global Guerillas, John Robb mentions, while discussing a recent halt in Iraqi oil exports:

On a side note, the US military’s inability to reverse neither the Iraqi insurgency’s tempo of operations nor its rate of innovation has created a stressed system that may result in a moral turning point. As one analyst suggested to me, it is only a matter of time now before Iraqi guerrillas overrun a US fire-base. The loss of life and drama from that event could cause a rapid collapse in our moral cohesion.

So, which is it? To be fair, Dan Darling mentions that the insurgents seem to shifting from targeting Iraqi civilians to U.S. military. Regardless, Dan Darling points to a drop of violence and possible political engagement with certain segments of the insurgents. John Robb blatantly states that the tempo of the insurgents haven’t decreased, that they have crippled Iraq’s oil operations and that it was only a matter of time before the insurgents overrun a U.S. firebase.

So, which is? Is it either/or? Or perhaps oddly, are the insurgents becoming more political open as their tempo of operation increasing? What is going on there in Iraq?

PS: From my understanding, Firebase (FB) is a temporary forward encampment providing artillery support.