Summary
In a move echoing Nixon’s trip to China, India and the US have announced a groundbreaking nuclear deal, which many have warned as “Nuclear Madness” helping to accelerate dangerous nuclear proliferation. “Unsettling” this thought is, the reality is that nuclear proliferation cannot be stopped, so the US must well to play the nuclear card when it can. The hope is that this deal is the beginning of growing closer ties between the two world’s leading and largest democracies, which includes the recognition of a new Core power into the fold of the Core states.

The great challenge is for the Post-Bush Administration to carry on with increasing US ties with India for the Bush Administration and the one after to resist temptations to make India a bulwark against China. India is too confident, important and practical to be a pawn for the US; hopefully, the US will not only recognize that, but can see India as a way for bringing more stability to the South Asia and its neighboring region and expanding the Core. India should not play any role in competing against China, but rather help bring China in to the Core as a responsible and productive partner.

Click here for further analysis including sections on:
- Nuclear Fears
- Risking Nuclear Issues for New Realities
- India and the Anglosphere? And What about China?

Related Past Postings:

1. Needed in Asia: Security and Energy Cooperation”
2. Year of Chinese-Indian Friendship…on Oil?
3. Getting India Right : Recreating the Anglosphere

Nuclear Fears
The grand deal between India and the US on India’s nuclear program was seen as a major concession by the US to India (at what many say, a high cost), as the Economist (March 02) reports:

Details of the final separation plan have yet to be made public. It is understood to list as civilian 14 out of 22 reactors, accounting for some 65% of india’s nuclear-power capacity. India will have the right to choose how to classify any future reactors. In return for assurances about the supply of nuclear fuel, it has accepted that once it has put a nuclear facility under international safeguards, it will not be able to withdraw it. These arrangements—giving India far more leeway than America had been demanding—may not be enough to enable Mr Bush to fulfil his offer to amend American laws and persuade other countries to change international rules which prevent nuclear trade with states that do not accept full safeguards.

Many fear that the weakening of the NPT and nuclear proliferation will be the prime consequence of the nuclear deal, especially considering questions on India’s nuclear weapons ambitions. The Economist notes that India has arguing against any agreement that would cap their ability to rapidly produce plutonium (fast-breeder reactor), raising fear of India’s nuclear ambitions especially when it initially stated that it would produce only enough to deter as a defensive weapon. Bob Herbert of NY Time, expresses such fears, when he calls the US-India nuclear deal “Nuclear Madness”

Additionally, there’s the question of the difference between India and Iran (despite that fact has signed the NPT, and India has not signed the NPT). Indeed, this Monday, the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns stated that “while Tehran was trying to extricate itself from the obligations to the IAEA, India was moving towards it. ‘India is the responsible one, Iran is the irresponsible one,’ he said.”

Risking Nuclear Issues for New Realities
While everyone has been concentrating on the nuclear consequences, especially on nuclear proliferation vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea, a wider dimension is required than the limited view of nuclear weapons.

As William Langewiesche of the Atlantic has pointed out proliferation is at the “Point of No Return”, so any analysis on the Indian nuclear deal must understand that the risk of proliferation is not as great when measured against getting building a relationship with a major New Core power.

The Economist does rightfully warns that are “there are plenty of opportunities for the world’s richest democracy and its largest to cement their friendship. Helping India to hone its nuclear skills is hardly a good place to start.” However, its misses the point that China, Russia and Japan can also offer India business deals and even coordination on hydrocarbon energy policy, but blessings on a nuclear program is something only the United States can do at this time.

If the US can reach out to India by addressing its security needs – especially difficult considering India’s energy dealing and stance on Iran and on US relationship with Pakistan – the US can then take the next steps of furthering and sealing economic ties, helping solidify India’s place in the Core and in the Anglosphere. Indeed, beyond helping India both modernize and normalize its nuclear energy program, what else does the US offer that China, Japan and Russia cannot readily offer as well?

Security has to be the foundation of a US-India and eventually an Anglosphere alliance, economics and energy will help solidify it.

India and the Anglosphere, but what about China?
Stephen Green of VodkaPundit is a little too eager when he announces “Welcome to the Anglosphere, India” last Thursday, a single deal wont make an Anglosphere with India a fait compli. But, its a great step indeed.

A number of pundits have commented on India as a potential counterweight against China. This is seen not only by folks in the US but Australia, Indonesia, Japan and others. But this is a false a dangerous hope.

Firstly, China is not a threat as long as it can become ever more integrated with the Old and New Core in the economics. An embraced China is less of a threat than an encircled stubborn China.

Secondly, India (like China) are too much of pragmatist and confident to acquiesce itself as a pawn in Washington’s game. India is recognizing its place in the world as a major partner and will pursue its interests as it sees fit, even if it means friction with the US.

The Bush Administration risked nuclear proliferation and the NPT to bring closer ties with India, recognizing that a new world paradigm is shaping up. Hopefully, the Bush Administration and one after take the next step to not only strengthen ties with India but also reach out to China.

The StrategyUnit has recently posted several articles relating to India, with the strongest being “Getting India Right : Recreating the Anglosphere“, where it is declared:

“There has been discussion that just as Great Britain gracefully passed its world power status to the United States, the United States must look to do the same with India or else face decline in the face of a raising China.”

Now the Economist (Feb 25), ahead of Bush’s March visit to India, leads with two articles highlighting the Bush Administration’s approach with India. The second article, “The Great India Hope Trick“, goes through the three major topics: 1) the difficulty surrounding the Bush Administration’s nuclear technology deal with India; and 2) the American temptation to see India as part of an anti-China axis partner; 3) while India needs and wants to be seen as an equal in any partnership with the US.

The article also touches moves by the US to offer technology to assist with India’s energy security needs, while it faces the difficulty dealing with India’s relationship with Iran, Syria and China on energy projects.

As mentioned earlier on StrategyUnit, India’s geostrategic location near the Middle East, Asia and Central Asia make it an essential ally and a practical ally with its shared Anglo history, language and democractic institutions. While somewhat differing from StrategyUnit, the Economist ends the article highlighting the attractiveness of India highlighting its “Stabiliy, Democracy, and Demography”:

Nevertheless, in the long term, India has two great attractions. One is stability. India has proven mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of power and the ability to withstand terrible internal conflicts—in Kashmir and the north-east, for example—without danger to its integrity. China’s eventual transition to democracy could be traumatic. Another attraction is demography. China’s one-child policy ensures that it will grow old before it gets rich: a generation of only children may suddenly find themselves struggling to support the parents who once pampered them. India will remain younger and more dynamic well into the middle of the 21st century.

For many reasons, a close partnership between India and America seems both desirable and inevitable. The fraught negotiation over the nuclear issue, however, has revealed how difficult it will be to achieve. To America, and to many Indians, it must seem inconceivable that India—still so poor, and so desperately in need of just the sort of help America is offering—should not jump at the chance of a special relationship. How on earth, for example, could the idea of siding with Iran instead be seriously debated? But for many in India, “non-alignment” is a synonym for independence, and should not be sacrificed, however enticing the prize. Moreover, so confident is India’s mood at the moment, that many seriously believe America needs it more than the other way round. Tomorrow belongs to Asia.

Other articles by StrategyUnit for 2006 on India:
1. “Needed in Asia: Security and Energy Cooperation”
2. “Year of Chinese-Indian Friendship…on Oil?“

There has been discussion that just as Great Britain gracefully passed its world power status to the United States, the United States must look to do the same with India or else face decline in the face of a raising China. But something else that needs as much mentioning is the geopolitical significance of India, being so close to the Middle East and Central Asia (something that the map on the left I hope conveys). It is also India geography that makes it an attractive ally and partner for the United States and the West.

India has moved beyond its former position as “neutral” and leading the non-aligned movement of the Cold War. Today, we see India as a growing high-tech, financial services and biotech powerhouse; and, while India is modernizing its economy like China, it is taking an open and democratic route. And just as US has its roots in the UK, so does India in many ways (beyond colonialism). Indeed, it belongs every bit as much as the Anglosphere, as the other principal members of the Anlgosphere (US, UK, Australia).

In the February-March issue of PolicyReview, Parag Khanna and C. Raja Mohan’s “Getting India Right” outlines a very comprehensive view of the geopolitical history and direction of the Indian state. Its a length article, but worth the read.

Indeed, in order to grow and survive, the United States and the West needs an ally and partner in the New Core, India is that state.

Taking a look at “Getting India Right”
Khanna and Mohan go through the usual argument for why India is an essential and undervalued partner for the United States: 1) Share democratic values, which the PM had recently emphasized; 2) US wants stability in Central Asia and The Middle East, the backyard of India; and 3) India has the ability to engage and limit China.

However, what I would like to share on Khanna and Mohan are some important concepts that should attain wider circulation:

1. The Indian Strategy – Neo-Curzonia, Multi-Alignment
Excerpt:

While there is no guarantee that India will become more allied or aligned, there has been a continuous trajectory toward a diplomatic posture which is perhaps best described as “neo-Curzonian,” after the British imperial viceroy and player of the “Great Game” Lord George Curzon. Ironically, India’s neo-Curzonian worldview is the logical heir to one of the nation’s strategic ur-texts, Kautilya’s fourth-century B.C. Arthashastras, which locates India at the nucleus of concentric rings of potential friends and foes. A neo-Curzonian foreign policy is premised on the logic of Indian centrality, permitting multidirectional engagement — or “multi-alignment” — with all major powers and seeking access and leverage from East Africa to Pacific Asia. Such a forward foreign policy emphasizes the revival of commercial cooperation; building institutional, physical and political links with neighboring regions to circumvent buffer states; developing energy supplies and assets; and pursuing multistate defense agreements and contracts. Today, India has recovered this 360-degree vision, looking west to boost investment from Europe and the Persian Gulf, north to secure stable energy supplies from Central Asia (including Iran), and east for partnerships and free trade agreements with South Korea and Australia. It engages actively in regional fora such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (saarc) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (asean) while not shying away from potential strategic competition with neighbors such as Pakistan and China. Furthermore, it has transitioned from demanding respect on the basis of its nuclear status to proving greatness on the basis of its political and economic accomplishments.

2. India – The Anchor in the Middle East, Central Asia and East Asia
Excerpt:

Historically, the U.S. has viewed the Middle East and Pacific Rim theaters as separate policy realms, with India falling in between and viewed through the exclusive prism of South Asian politics. But India lies at the crossroads of Asia, a factor which was at the heart of British policy towards the East. Only after the Second World War and the partition of the Subcontinent was India’s position weakened, a shift accentuated by India’s socialist and inward-looking policies. Yet as India’s weight grows in the international system, it can become a strong anchor in support of America’s ambition to pursue a liberal order across Eurasia. Indeed, if the U.S. should welcome the emergence of any one Asian power, it should be India, which shares America’s concern over the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, sub-state nuclear proliferation, and China’s ambitions. Furthermore, each Indian election entrenches its status and credibility as the world’s largest democracy, and its growing economic clout and diaspora presence in the U.S. are tying the two societies on opposite sides of the world together as never before. Indeed, there is not a single area in which India’s rise threatens America’s interests.

3. India’s Economy and Demographics v. China’s
Khanna and Mohan both speak of India’s advantages over China, despite China being in the spot light at the moment. China may have the “industrial revolution” in terms of manufacturing, but India is conquering the “information revolution” in the important new service-sector industries. A similar vain was mentioned in Foreign Policy’s “India Outsmarts China” piece, they outline India’s lead in the “knowledge workers” area:IT, financial services, biotech, medical services, etc. See an excerpt of “India Outsmarts China” here.

Another of India’s advantage is its population. India’s population is expected to be reaching its work-force peak in 2015, around the same China’s is expected to shrink and India “may even provide surplus labor to an aging China”. As Khanna and Mohan notes, “India is aging gracefully while China is heading towards an unprecedented challenge of getting old before it gets rich.”.

4. US-India – Building Closer Ties: Immigration and Economic Integretion
Excerpt:

India’s quest to go global has not only reached the United States; in many ways it originates here. Numbering almost two million, Indian-Americans are now the wealthiest ethnic minority in the country, boasting a median income of $60,000 and 200,000 millionaires. Fifteen percent of Silicon Valley start-ups have been launched by Indians, many of them first-generation immigrants who have chosen to make the U.S. their home….Given the Indian diaspora’s contributions to American economic and cultural life, the more than 50 percent decrease in h1-b visas for Indian professionals has been extremely disturbing to Indians in both countries, and the 25 percent drop in mba applicants from India is similarly worrying. If the U.S. does not allow Indian nationals to become Indian-Americans — in a demonstration of American pride, many prefer this term to be de-hyphenated as well — it ignores the Asia Foundation’s advice that the Bush administration should “continue to take advantage of Indian-Americans as a bridge” between Washington and New Delhi.

Towards the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Pentagon commissioned the Rand Corporation’s George Tanham to report on India’s strategic thinking; he famously concluded that there was none. This is no longer the case. India is beginning to rediscover the enduring elements of its own traditional geopolitical thinking and actively considering partnership with America, if only to advance its own interests. Within a constellation of shifting regional alliances among major states and powers such as the U.S., eu, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, China, South Korea, and Japan, India’s relevance to the future of international power balances is assured. India’s strategic canvas is broadening, as is its thinking in the military, economic, diplomatic, and cultural realms. America’s trade with China will eclipse that which it has with India for years to come, but democratic India is sure to be a more reliable partner.

Better relations, however, create rising expectations. As American and Indian interests naturally come into closer alignment, both countries must recognize that their noisy democracies will examine every minute detail in the agreements that the two governments negotiate. Preventing these noises from overwhelming the long-awaited strategic signals of greater engagement will be the most difficult challenge that Washington and Delhi have to overcome.

Conclusion and Final Comments
As mentioned earlier and throughout this blog, the US and the West must reach out beyond its current base to find new partners in the New Core, such as Brazil, India, China etc. However, there are unique qualities about India that make it an ideal candidate as the first New Core member to be fully embraced by the US.

India dynamic knowledge economy and democratic values (which it has increasingly identified as part of its foreign policy orientation) is something the United States must encourage and integrate with. India is not just a large state, but also represents ~20% of humanity.

On the realpoltik side, India is in a geopolitically important area of the world, in the crossroad of Eurasia and the shipping-lanes that carry Middle East oil and near the energy rich area of Central Asia. For the US, India is too important to ignore – we must embrace her or lose her to a geopolitical orientation contrary to our interests.

US and India does have disagreements over the issue of a Iran-Pakistan-India energy pipeline that is an essential part of India’s energy security goals. And also, there is the recent announcement of the India-China Energy Partnership. The Iranian pipeline runs contrary to US goals of isolating Iran. How the US handles this issue, as well as its cooperation with Pakistan, will be a test of how viable a US-Indian partnership is.

India is eager to find partnerships where it can, but it’s up to the US to find a way to nurture a true deeper relationship that goes beyond an partnership of convenience. Let’s hope that the US (especially under the future Post-Bush administration) has the vision and finesse to help lead the way.

Contrarian Views
In “Is India a Menance to the West?“, Samizdata posted a counterpoint with India (under strong Hindu nationalism) being the potential enemy further down the line. He quotes Immanuel Wallenstein, who stated:

Was then the new Indo-U.S. joint statement a victory for U.S. diplomacy? In it, the U.S. for the very first time legitimated India’s role as a nuclear power, by promising India that it “will work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realizes its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security.” This of course undermined enormously the already weak position of the U.S. in opposing Iranian nuclear ambitions, since what India has received from the U.S. is precisely what Iran has been claiming is its right, “full civil nuclear energy.”

And in return, what did the U.S. get? – a promise “to combat terrorism relentlessly.” Since India was already doing this, it wasn’t very much. Meanwhile, India is maintaining its close relations with Iran and Russia, and even (on paper) a strategic alliance with China. More importantly, India is proceeding with Project Seabird, aimed at turning it into the major military power in the Indian Ocean. This does not make the Chinese too happy, to be sure, but it shouldn’t make the U.S. too happy either, since at the moment, it is the U.S. that is the major military power in the Indian Ocean.